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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade North Carolina's annexation statutes
have been the subject of much litigation. These challenges have
taken numerous approaches in seeking to have the various annexa-
tion ordinances declared invalid. Many of these challenges have
sought to have the statutes themselves declared invalid as a viola-
tion of both the United States Constitution and the North Caro-
lina Constitution. Still other approaches have sought to have the
actions of the annexing municipality declared illegal for failure to
comply with these annexation statutes. One theme is visible
throughout all of the challenges to annexation, the legislature has
determined that annexation serves the public good and the courts
are determined to give this legislative finding effect.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO ANNEXATION
Over the past ten years the North Carolina annexation stat-
utes have undergone extensive constitutional challenges. The vast
majority of these challenges have been based on either due process
grounds or equal protection grounds. The first major challenge of
the decade, to the constitutionality of annexation by a North Caro-
lina municipality, arose in Texfi Industries v. Fayetteville.1 In that
case the petitioner, a corporation, sought injunctive relief from an
ordinance adopted by the respondent seeking to annex, inter alia,
the area that petitioner leased and operated his business upon. Pe-
titioner alleged that the annexation statutes under which the re-
spondent had proceeded were unconstitutional on their face and as
they were applied to the petitioner. More specifically, Texfi alleged
that N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-24 was insufficient to give parties af-
fected by the annexation proceeding adequate notice of the pend-
ing action and that N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-25 was unconstitutional
because it failed to allow corporate citizens a vote on annexation
while granting that right to natural citizens. The Superior Court of
Cumberland County found for the respondent and the North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals affirmed.2
Justice Britt, writing for the majority, addressed the first is-
sue, regarding the constitutionality of N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-24,
by noting that annexation by a municipal corporation is a political
1. 301 N.C. 1, 269 S.E.2d 142 (1980).
2. 44 N.C. App. 268, 261 S.E.2d 21 (1980).
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question within the power of the state legislature to regulate.3 The
legislature had enacted N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-24 to provide af-
fected parties with the necessary notice of the pending annexation
by a municipal corporation. The respondent had complied with
N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-24 in that they had published notice for
four consecutive weeks in a newspaper in the county with a general
circulation in the municipality. The notice had included the place,
date and time of the required public hearing on the proposed an-
nexation and had also included a metes and bounds description of
the proposed annexation as required by N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-24.
The court held that this notice was sufficient to safeguard the peti-
tioner's right to due process of law.4 The court stated that "the
guarantee of due process is satisfied when notice is given which is
reasonably calculated, under all of the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action." 5 In so deciding
the court rejected the petitioner's argument that the respondent
should be required to send personal notice to each landowner in
the affected area.
The court next addressed the petitioner's argument that it was
denied equal protection of the law by being denied a vote in the
annexation referendum. Prior to repeal, N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-24
stated that if, at the public hearing on the proposed annexation,
fifteen percent of the residents of the area to be annexed sign a
petition opposing the annexation, that the municipality must sub-
mit the issue to the qualified voters in the proposed area before
the annexation ordinance can be passed.6 This right to vote in an
annexation. referendum was limited, however, to natural persons.
Petitioner alleged that this was a violation of the fundamental
right to vote. The North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that the
law did not discriminate against a "suspect class" and therefore
the strict scrutiny test established by the United States Supreme
Court in Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 151 was inap-
plicable. Finding that failure of the statute to provide a vote for
corporations did not discriminate upon a suspect classification, the
North Carolina Supreme Court turned to the second tier of the
test established by the United States Supreme Court. This tier of
3. Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
5. Texfi, 301 N.C. at 9, 269 S.E.2d at 148.
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-24 was repealed by Session Laws 1983, c. 636, s. 26
effective June 29, 1983.
7. 395 U.S. 621, (1969).
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the test is used when governmental action is challenged on grounds
that there is a violation of the party's equal protection guarantees.8
This test requires only that the classification or distinction drawn
by the statute or action bear some rational relationship to a con-
ceivably legitimate governmental interest. The court noted the dif-
ficulties that would arise in giving corporations a vote and held
that the petitioner corporation had no fundamental right to vote in
the annexation referendum.9
In Moody v. Carrboro,10 the North Carolina Supreme Court
was again faced with constitutional challenges to annexation stat-
utes and procedures. In Moody the petitioner contested the consti-
tutionality of N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-45 through N.C. GEN. STAT.
§160A-56." The petitioner also alleged that the annexation consti-
tuted a taking of private property without just compensation.
Petitioner's first issue, regarding the constitutionality of N.C.
GEN. STAT. §160A-45 through N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-56, was pre-
mised on the language contained in N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-50(f)
which provides that review of an annexation order shall be in the
superior court of the county in which the annexing municipality
lies and "shall be conducted without a jury." The petitioner argued
that the language of this section made the entire procedure for an-
nexation by cities of over 5,000 or more residents a violation of
N.C. Constitution Article I, section 25. N.C. Constitution Article I,
section 25 provides for a trial by jury for "controversies at law re-
specting property." The court, however, rejected the petitioner's
argument, relying on their holding in In Re Annexation Ordi-
nance.2 In that case the North Carolina Supreme Court had re-
jected an identical argument and found that the right to a jury
trial applies only to those cases where a jury trial was available
under the common law or was procured by statute at the time the
constitution was adopted. If not established in either of these cate-
gories the right to a trial by jury could only be granted by statute.
The annexation statutes were not found unconstitutional for their
failure to provide for a trial by jury.
The court next addressed the issue raised by the petitioner
8. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, (1979).
9. Texfi, 301 N.C. at 13, 269 S.E.2d at 150. (Exum, J. and Carlton, J.
dissenting).
10. 301 N.C. 318, 271 S.E.2d 265 (1980).
11. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-45 to -56 (1989) regulates annexation by cities of
5,000 or more.
12. 253 N.C. 637, 117 S.E.2d 795 (1961).
[Vol. 14:135
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that annexation constituted a taking of private property without
just compensation. The petitioner claimed that he would be sub-
jected to substantial ad valorem taxes without receiving in return
any substantial benefit that he did not already have. The court
again turned to their opinion in In Re Annexation Ordinance.13
The court there stated that when an area is annexed by a munici-
pality pursuant to the law, that a taking has not occurred under
either the State or Federal Constitution. The petitioner, said the
court, had adequate safeguards within the annexation statutes
themselves to insure that he would be provided with the services of
the municipality on a nondiscriminatory basis." The court did
note, however, that the municipality was not required to duplicate
already existing services in the area.15
In 1981 the North Carolina Court of Appeals was called upon
to decide the constitutionality of an annexation statute adopted by
the Town of Highlands."8 In that case the landowners, who were
about to be annexed into the town limits of Highlands, alleged that
the local annexation ordinance violated the equal protection re-
quirements of Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitu-
tion and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Consti-
tution. The landowners alleged that the ordinance was in violation
because it failed to furnish them sewer services on an equal basis
with present residents of the town and by its failure to include in
the annexation plan a 105 acre golf course. This court, applying
the "valid legislative purpose" test, found that the statute did not
violate the equal protection provisions of either the North Carolina
Constitution or the United States Constitution. As to the petition-
ers' first, issue the court while acknowledging that the residents of
the newly annexed area would not receive sewer systems, found
dispositive the fact that not all of the original residents of High-
lands had sewer systems. The court also stated that a second cru-
cial point was the fact that there were adequate mechanisms for
eventually providing sewer systems for the annexed area.
The court then addressed the petitioners' second contention
that the failure to include the 105 acre golf course was a violation
of due process. The petitioners stated that they had not been
13. Id.
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-49(h) (1987) allows a resident of an annexed area
to seek a writ of mandamus if he fails to receive services from the municipality on
a nondiscriminatory basis.
15. Huntley v. Potter, 255 N.C. 619, 122 S.E.2d 681 (1961).
16. Abbott v. Town of Highlands, 52 N.C. App. 69, 277 S.E.2d 820 (1981).
1992]
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"treated in the same way" as the owner of the golf course.1" This
court stated that contiguity and cohesiveness were not constitu-
tional requirements under N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-21, and unless
the contiguous areas are excluded for a constitutionally impermis-
sible reason, the court could not substitute its opinion for ,that of
the legislature.1 8
In In Re Annexation Ordinance # D-21927,19 the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court was faced with multiple challenges to the con-
stitutionality of an annexation ordinance adopted by the City of
Winston-Salem, and the North Carolina General Statutes relating
to annexation. After challenging the annexation in the Superior
Court of Forsyth County and losing, the petitioners sought review
in the North Carolina Supreme Court. The petitioners' first argu-
ment was that the lack of a definition for the phrase "major trunk
water mains and sewer outfall lines" in N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-47
made the delegation of authority to annex to municipal governing
boards unconstitutional because they were without adequate stan-
dards and guidelines. The petitioners also alleged that the delega-
tion was unconstitutional due to the use of the word "substan-
tially" in N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-47(3)(a)2 Justice Myer, writing
for the majority, found that the statute itself established the
guideline for the phrase "major trunk water mains and sewer out-
fall lines" as being those "which, when constructed, will allow
water and sewer service to be provided to individual lots and sub-
divisions in the annexed area in the same manner that such ser-
vices are provided within the existing corporate limits."2 Moving
next to the petitioners' argument that the use of the word "sub-
stantially" in N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-47(3)(a) rendered the statute
unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous, Justice Myer again
looked to the statutes for a solution. N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-50(f)
makes the determination of compliance with the provisions of N.C.
GEN. STAT. §160A-47 the province of the courts and hence the
17. Id. at 78, 277 S.E.2d at 826.
18. Id.
19. 303 N.C. 220, 278 S.E.2d 224 (1981).
20. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-47(3)(a) (1989) states in relevant part:
Provide for extending police protection, fire protection, solid waste col-
lection and street maintainance services to the area to be annexed on the
date of annexation on substantially the same basis and in the same man-
ner as such services are provided within the the rest of the municipality
prior to annexation.
21. In re Annexation, 303 N.C. at 225, 278 S.E.2d at 228.
[Vol. 14:135
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phrase did not render the statute unconstitutionally vague and
ambiguous.
The petitioners next argued that the annexation statute was
unconstitutional because it subjected residents of the annexed area
to taxation even though they did not have the right to vote for
members of the city's governing board who adopted the annexation
ordinance. The petitioners alleged that this constituted taxation
without representation and deprivation of property without due
process. This court, again turning to its opinion in In Re Annexa-
tion Ordinances,22 restated the rule that simply subjecting an-
nexed property to future taxation by the annexing municipality
was not a violation of the State or Federal Constitution.2 '3 The pe-
titioners also argued that their rights to due process and equal pro-
tection.were violated because they did not have the opportunity to
vote on the annexation issue. This court, relying on previous opin-
ions, rejected both the due process 2' and the equal protection25
arguments.
The petitioners' last challenge to the constitutionality of the
annexation plan alleged that their due process and equal protec-
tion rights were violated because they would have no adequate
remedy at law if the city failed to provide the services called for in
the annexation plan. The petitioners reasoned that they would
have no remedy because the time for appeal would have expired
prior to the time called for in the annexation plan for the city to
begin the paving of certain streets in the annexed area. This court
found this argument to be without merit. When reviewed by a
court the annexation plan and the provision of services thereunder
become a court-ordered plan and any failure to comply can be
remedied by the court.26
22. 253 N.C. 637, 117 S.E.2d 795 (1961).
23. In re Annexation, 303 N.C. at 228, 278 S.E.2d at 230.
24. Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, (1907); In Re Annexation Ordinances,
253 N.C. 637, 117 S.E.2d 795 (1961); Lutterloh v. Fayetteville, 149 N.C. 65, 62
S.E. 758 (1908); Manly v. Raleigh, 57 N.C. 370 (1859).
25. Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U.S. 114 (1900); Wilkerson v. Coralville, 478
F.2d 709 (8th Cir. 1973); Garren v. Winston Salem, 463 F.2d 54 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1039 (1972); Thompson v. Whitley, 344 F. Supp. 480 (E.D.N.C.
1972); Rexham Corp. v. Pineville, 26 N.C. App. 349, 216 S.E.2d 445 (1975).
26. In re Anexxation, 303 N.C. at 227, 278 S.E.2d at 229. Subsequent cases
have reiterated this idea of court approval constituting a court order with the
ordinary remedies available to the landowner if the annexing municipality fails to
comply with the court order. In 1982, a challenge to the constitutionality of the
N.C. annexation statutes was brought in the U.S. District Court for the Middle
1992]
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In Raintree Homeowners Assoc. v. Charlotte," the United
States District Court rejected an argument by petitioners that the
North Carolina annexation statutes were unconstitutional. The pe-
titioners' argument was premised on the lack of judicial review for
arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable acts of annexation by munici-
palities under N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-50.2 8 The petitioners argued
that the sole purpose for the annexation of their land was to in-
crease the municipality's tax base. The petitioners argued that the
annexation of their area, while failing to annex poorer areas, was
an arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action on the part of the
city. This court rejected the argument set forth by the petitioners
saying that there was no reasonableness requirement in the annex-
ation statutes. The court went on to say that the constitutionality
of annexation had been consistently upheld with two noted excep-
tions where the annexation ordinances were discriminatory.29 If
discriminatory, the ordinance would be in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The court here, however, found no discrimina-
tion present in the statute and rejected the petitioners' equal pro-
tection claim.
In 1984, the North Carolina Court of Appeals was called upon
to decide a question of the constitutionality of the time limits set
forth in N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-49 and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-50.30
In the Matter of City of Durham Annexation Order,31 the peti-
tioners argument was based on their belief that the time limits es-
tablished by these statutes presented an unreasonable procedural
burden on their due process rights under the State and Federal
District of North Carolina. That action arose from this same annexation proceed-
ing and, like its predecessor, was rejected by the court. See Baldwin v. Winston-
Salem, 544 F. Supp. 123 (M.D.N.C. 1982).
27. 543 F. Supp. 625 (W.D.N.C. 1982).
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-50 (1989) limits judicial review of the annexation
process to determining compliance with the requirements of the annexation
statutes.
29. A city may not manipulate its boundaries for the purpose of removing
voters from the city because of their race. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339,
345 (1960). If the state chooses to give residents the opportunity to vote on the
annexation, that right must be afforded to all residents, not just freeholders. Hay-
ward v. Clay, 573 F.2d 187 (4th Cir. 1978).
30. There are numerous time limits established by these statutes and it is
unclear from the opinion which time limits the objection was based on or whether
it was an objection to all of the time limits contained in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-
49 and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-50.
31. 66 N.C. App. 472, 316 S.E.2d 649 (1984).
142 [Vol. 14:135
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Constitution. The court, determining that the petitioners had only
alleged an unconstitutional burdening of their rights by N.C. GEN.
STAT. §160A-49 without demonstrating how their rights were bur-
dened or violated, held that the petitioners had presented no con-
stitutional question for the court to decide.
In deciding the constitutionality of the time limits set forth in
N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-50, this court relied on the North Carolina
Supreme Court's opinion in Moody v. Carrboro32 In that case the
court had approved the procedure established by N.C. GEN. STAT.
§160A-50, saying that it was the intent of the legislature to provide
an expedited review, limited in scope, and avoiding unnecessary
delays.
The petitioners' last argument was that N.C. GEN. STAT.
§160A-48 was unconstitutionally vague. The petitioners' conten-
tion was based on the language contained in N.C. GEN. STAT.
§160A-48(a)(2) which requires "every part" of the area to be an-
nexed to meet the requirements of subsection (c) that "part of all"
of the area to be annexed must be developed for urban purposes.
The petitioners argued that the two subsections conflicted with
one another and rendered the statute unconstitutionally vague.
This court, relying on In Re Annexation Ordinance" and In Re
Annexation Ordinance,4 rejected this argument based on the lan-
guage of N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-48.
During 1984 and 1985 there were a number of challenges to
the constitutionality of annexation statutes based on N.C. GEN.
STAT. §160A-56.15 That statute exempted certain named munici-
palities from complying with certain provisions of the annexation
statutes. Although none of these challenges were successful, N.C.
GEN. STAT. §160A-56 was repealed in 1983.36
In Piedmont Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Greensboro,37 a consti-
tutional challenge arose from an annexation statute adopted by the
General Assembly in 1986.38 The statute provided that certain land
32. 301 N.C. 318, 271 S.E.2d 265 (1980).
33. 284 N.C. 442, 202 S.E.2d 143 (1974).
34. 255 N.C. 633, 122 S.E.2d 690 (1961).
35. Knight v. Wilmington, 73 N.C. App. 254, 326 S.E.2d 376 (1985); In Re
Durham Annexation Order # 5991 for Area A, 69 N.C. App. 77, 316 S.E.2d 649
(1984); Campbell v. Greensboro, 70 N.C. App. 252, 319 S.E.2d 323 (1984).
36. 1983 Session Laws, c. 636, s. 27, effective to all annexations where resolu-
tions of intent were adopted on or after 29 June 1983.
37. 324 N.C. 499, 380 S.E.2d 107 (1989).
38. 1986 Session Laws, c. 818, s. 3.
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contiguous to the City of Greensboro be annexed to the city. Peti-
tioners claimed that the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and Article I, Section 19 of the Constitution of
North Carolina had been violated because other similar property
next to their property had not been annexed. The court held that
it was not a violation of the State or Federal Constitution to annex
certain property without annexing other property similarly situ-
ated. This court went on to say that to hold that the statute vio-
lated the Constitution would, in fact, be a violation of Article VII,
Section 1 of the Constitution of North Carolina. 9
The petitioners also challenged the constitutionality of chap-
ter 818 by alleging that it was a violation of Article II, Section 24
of the Constitution of North Carolina because it was a local act
regarding water, sewer and sanitation services to the annexed
area. 0 In rejecting this argument the court concluded that the an-
nexed area was not being subjected to different treatment than if
the city had proceeded under the general annexation laws, but
rather, they were assured that they would receive the same treat-
ment. The General Assembly had simply made the codified provi-
sions applicable to this annexation through the use of a local act.
During the past decade the United States Supreme Court has
heard several cases dealing with the application of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.41 to annexation proceedings. In 1965 Congress
passed the Voting Rights Act to give effect to the Fifteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 42 U.S.C. 1973c re-
quires that certain states or political subdivisions of the states that
come within the provision seek preclearance from the Attorney
General of the United States or the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia for any change in the "standard, prac-
tice or procedure with respect to voting ' '42 made after 1 November
1964. In 1971 this statute was made applicable to annexation pro-
ceedings undertaken by these same states and political subdivi-
39. N.C. CONST. art. VII, § 1 provides that the General Assembly shall affix
the boundaries of cities.
40. N.C. CONST. art. II, § 24 states:
"(1) Prohibited Subjects. The General Assembly shall not enact any lo-
cal, private, or special act or resolution:
(a) Related to health, sanitation, and the abatement of
nuisances. .. ."
41. 42 U.S.C. 1973c (1989).
42. 42 U.S.C. 1973c (1989).
[Vol. 14:135
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sions.4- This expansion of the Voting Rights Act was an attempt to
prevent the municipalities from diluting the black vote by ex-
panding into predominately white areas without adjusting the vot-
ing wards so that the black vote would be protected. The Act has
been most frequently applied when the annexation was coupled
with at large elections or where a particular voting precinct or
ward within the municipality with a black voter majority has been
enlarged with white voters. When such a proposal is received or
heard by the Attorney General of the United States or the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia, they are charged
with the duty of determining if the proposal has either a discrimi-
natory intent or a discriminatory effect. If either is present the
proposal cannot be approved. The burden of demonstrating that
the annexation does not have a discriminatory intent or effect lies
with the annexing municipality.4" The determination of which
states or political subdivisions of states are required to proceed
under 42 U.S.C. 1973c is made under 42 U.S.C. 1973b. 42 U.S.C.
1973b states that the section is applicable against any state or po-
litical subdivision of a state which:
(1) the Attorney General determines maintained on November 1,
1964, any test or devise [for determining eligible voters], and with
respect to which (2) the Director of the Census determines that
less than 50 per centum of the persons of voting age residing
therein were registered on November 1, 1964, or that less than 50
per centum of such persons voted in the presidential election of
November 1964.""
There are currently forty North Carolina counties that come under
this provision. 4' These counties are required to comply with the
provisions of the Voting Rights Act requiring preclearance before
the annexation ordinance can become enforceable.
In Port Arthur v. United States,47 the plaintiff, Port Arthur,
43. Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971).
44. McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130 (1981).
45. 42 U.S.C. 1973c also provides for the Attorney General and the Director
of the Census to make determination in 1968 and again in 1975.
46. Anson, Beaufort, Bertie, Bladen, Camden, Caswell, Chowan, Cleveland,
Craven, Cumberland, Edgecombe, Franklin, Gaston, Gates, Granville, Greene,
Guilford, Halifax, Harnett, Hertford, Hoke, Jackson, Lee, Lenoir, Martin, Nash,
Northampton, Onslow, Pasquotank, Perquimans, Person, Pitt, Robeson, Rocking-
ham, Scotland, Union, Vance, Washington, Wayne, and Wilson. Telephone Inter-
iew with North Carolina Attorney General's Office (June 21, 1990).
47. 459 U.S. 159 (1982).
1992]
11
Blevins: Municipal Annexation in North Carolina: A Look at the Past Decade
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1992
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
had consolidated with two neighboring cities and had annexed a
previously unincorporated area. The percentage of black popula-
tion within Port Arthur dropped from 45.21% to 40.56% as a re-
sult of this combination of consolidation and annexation. Appel-
lant city eventually sought approval of these actions in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia. The appellant
also sought approval to expand the City Council from seven mem-
bers who had previously been elected at large to a nine member
council. After an initial rejection of the plan by the district court,
the municipality switched to a plan for electing councilmen which
called for election from four single member districts, two of which
had black majorities, election of two other members from two
other districts, and an at large election of two other members from
the latter two districts and of the mayor. All council seats were to
be governed by a majority vote rule requiring a run-off if the can-
didate did not receive a majority. The district court concluded that
the annexation plan could not be denied preclearance as being dis-
criminatory in purpose, but conditioned its approval of the annex-
ation on the city changing the proposed election process from a
majority vote to a plurality. The appellant appealed the decision of
the district court to the United States Supreme Court. The Court
held that the district court had not exceeded its authority by con-
ditioning clearance on the elimination of the majority vote require-
ment. The Court held that section 5 of the Voting Rights Act did
not forbid all expansions of municipal borders that dilutes the vot-
ing power of particular groups in the community, but such expan-
sion can be approved only if modifications in the electoral plan,
calculated to neutralize to the extent possible any adverse effect on
the political participation of minority groups, are adopted.
In Pleasant Grove v. United States,4 8 the United States Su-
preme Court was again faced with a question of the application of
the Voting Rights Act to an annexation proceeding. In that case
the appellant, who had what was thought to be an all white popu-
lation at that time,49 sought preclearance for two annexations. The
first annexation, the Glasgow addition, involved annexing an area
where an all white extended family lived. The annexation was un-
dertaken at the request of the family. The second annexation in-
48. 479 U.S. 462 (1987).
49. At the time of the district court's decision there were 32 non-voting black
inhabitants in a nursing home. Neither the district court or the city was aware of
their existence.
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volved the annexing of a vacant parcel of land where it was antici-
pated that an all white residential neighborhood would be built in
the future. The United States Attorney General refused to preclear
the annexation finding that the appellant's refusal to annex an ad-
jacent black neighborhood was indicative of the appellant's intent
to annex only white areas. Appellant sought declaratory relief in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. This
relief was also denied the appellant. On appeal to United States
Supreme Court, saying that the appellant's failure to annex black
areas while annexing non-black areas was highly significant in
demonstrating a discriminatory purpose, affirmed the lower deci-
sion. The Court noted that annexation of vacant parcel of land on
which residential construction is anticipated must be precleared.60
The appellant argued that since there were no black voters in
the municipal limits at the time of the annexations that the
planned annexations could not possibly have an adverse effect on
black voting. Therefore, reasoned the appellant, it made no sense
to say that they had a discriminatory purpose. The Court, how-
ever, found that the impermissible purpose under the Voting
Rights Act was applicable to anticipated as well present circum-
stances. Justice White, writing for the majority, found it quite
plausible that the annexations were motivated by the impermissi-
ble purpose of minimizing future black voting strength. Finding
that the appellant had failed to carry his burden of proof, the
Court affirmed the decision of the lower court.
It appears clear from the foregoing that constitutional chal-
lenges to the annexation statutes in North Carolina have been
quite unsuccessful. Not a single annexation proceeding under the
North Carolina annexation statutes has been found to be unconsti-
tutional over the past decade. However for those states that have
been brought within the coverage of the Voting Rights Act, the
decision to annex must be carefully scrutinized for actions that
may be construed to have a discriminatory purpose or effect. This
close scrutiny is required on the part of the annexing municipality
because it seems doubtless that the United States Attorney Gen-
eral, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia,
and the United States Supreme Court will look at the annexation
under equally close scrutiny.
50. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980). In this case the
United States Supreme Court affirmed the denial of preclearance to thirteen of
sixty annexations. Nine annexations involved vacant lots.
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III. CHALLENGES TO ANNEXATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE POWER TO
ANNEX GENERALLY
In the past decade there has been a significant amount of
litigation stemming from North Carolina's annexation statutes.51
This litigation has involved challenges to both the statutory lan-
guage and the statutes as they have been applied in particular
circumstances.
In 1980, the North Carolina Supreme Court was called upon to
decide the validity of an annexation ordinance adopted by the City
of Salisbury. 52 In that case the city adopted an annexation ordi-
nance which was designed to effect the annexation of two areas of
land known as Area A and Area B. The plaintiff, who owned prop-
erty in Area A, challenged the statute in the Superior Court of
Rowan County. When the superior court affirmed the ordinance
the plaintiff sought review in the North Carolina Supreme Court.
The ordinance was only as it applied to Area A. The court noted
that the record demonstrated substantial compliance with the ap-
plicable annexation statutes by the city. Consequently the burden
of showing that the city had not met the statutory requirements or
that there had been irregularities in the proceedings which materi-
ally prejudiced their rights was found to be on the plaintiff.5 3
The plaintiff's first assignment of error was with the city's
method of calculation of population and degree of land subdivi-
sion.54 The plaintiffs alleged that the city had failed to comply
with §160A-54. 55 The plaintiff's objections were due to the treat-
51. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-30 (1989).
52. Food Town v. Salisbury, 300 N.C. 21, 265 S.E.2d 123 (1980).
53. Id. at 25, 265 S.E.2d at 126. This court relied on their opinions in In Re
Annexation Ordinance, 278 N.C. 641, 180 S.E.2d 851 (1971); and Huntley v. Pot-
ter, 255 N.C. 619, 122 S.E.2d 681 (1961) for this proposition.
54. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-54 (1987) states, in relevant part: "In determin-
ing population and degree of land subdivision for purposes of meeting the re-
quirements of G.S. § 160A-48, the municipality shall use methods calculated to
provide reasonably accurate results."
55. The following is the method utilized by the defendant in making the cal-
culations required by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-54 (1987):
The Rowan County tax and subdivision maps have been used to de-
termine the number of lots and tracts as well as their acreage. There are
several methods which can be used in determining what is a lot or tract
in making an appraisal of an area to be annexed. The method used in
this report considered a group of lots in single ownership and used for a
single purpose as being a single tract and referenced by single tax map
parcel number. Where a single ownership tract was divided by a street
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ment of Milford Terrace, a subdivision in the area to be annexed.
Within the subdivision there were numerous lots that were 25 feet
in width. Plaintiff argued that the city should be forced to follow
the formal subdivision lines of Milford Terrace. The court noted
that §160A-54 did not set forth a particular method for determin-
ing the number of lots in an area to be annexed. The only require-
ment of §160A-54 is that it be "calculated to produce reasonably
accurate results." In this the development of Milford Terrace had
not followed the subdivision lines as it was recorded."6 Finding
that, under the circumstances, the defendant's method of calcula-
tion was " eminently reasonable," the court rejected the plaintiff's
first assignment of error.
The plaintiff's next assignment of error was that the city had
followed subdivision lines in previous annexation proceedings and
that the decision to do otherwise in this proceeding was arbitrary
and capricious. The court also rejected this challenge saying that
"[t]he fact that different methods of lot calculation have been used
by the city in past annexations is of no import where, as here, the
record establishes that the method utilized in the annexation
under scrutiny complies with the requirements of G.S. §160A-
54. -W
Plaintiff's next contention was that their property had been
improperly counted as a single lot rather than multiple lots. The
lots in question were contiguous and housed the office and ware-
house facilities of the plaintiff. The plaintiff argued that only lots
C and D of their property were being used to house these facilities
and that lots A and B, which were unimproved should be counted
separately. The court found, however, that lots A and B were being
used to support the facilities located on lots C and D. This, the
court ruled, was sufficient to support a finding that the entire tract
was being used as a single parcel by the plaintiff.
Plaintiff next argued that the city had failed to comply with
G.S. §160A-54 by failing to include in their calculations eight areas
of Milford Terrace which constituted unopened portions of streets
in the subdivision which are otherwise opened and maintained by
the State. Plaintiff's argument was based on the possibility of the
right-of-way, the resulting division was counted as multiple tracts rather
than one tract.
Food Town, 300 N.C. at 26, 265 S.E.2d at 127.
56. Deed restriction required ownership of three lots before construction
could proceed. Food Town, 300 N.C. at 256 S.E.2d at 127.
57. Id. at 27, 256 S.E.2d at 127.
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land being withdrawn from dedication at some future date. The
court, relying on an earlier opinion, held that the streets were not
subject to being withdrawn from dedication."8 The court, therefore,
also rejected this argument.
The court next turned to the plaintiffs argument that the
figures submited by the city under G.S. §160A-54 did not comply
with the requirements of G.S. §160A-48(c) 9 The trial court had
concluded that the five-percent margin of error found in §160A-54
was also applicable to the requirements of §160A-54. Finding that
this conclusion by the trial court was erroneous, this court set
about determining the correct percentage of the land that was be-
ing used for permissible purposes. Upon recalculation this court
determined that the city had only established that 59.6% of the
property to be annexed was being used for a qualifying purpose
under §160A-48. Concluding that the trial court had erred in ap-
plying the five percent margin of area to the requirements of
§160A-48 and further concluding that the city failed to meet the
use test set forth in §160A-48, the court reversed the finding of the
trial court affirming the action of the governing board of the city.
The next major challenge to annexation arose in 1981.0 In In
Re Annexation Ordinance #D-21927 the plaintiffs assigned a
number of errors to the trial court's affirmation of an annexation
ordinance adopted by the city of Winston-Salem.6 1 The plaintiffs'
first argument was that the provisions of N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-45
should be regarded as part of the procedure for annexation by cit-
ies of 5,000 or more or, in the alternative, that if §160A-45 was not
part of the procedure for annexation that it established a separate
"reasonableness" test which must be considered by the judiciary
when determining compliance of an annexation proceeding with
the requirements of the statutes.2
58. "It is now well settled [that] the dedication of a street may not be with-
drawn, if the dedication has been accepted and the street or any part of it is
actually opened and used by the public." Russell v. Coggin, 232 N.C. 674, 675, 62
S.E.2d 70, 71 (1950).
59. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-48(c) (1987) establishes the use test which must
be met before an annexation may proceed by towns of 5000 or more. The corre-
sponding statute for smaller cities is found at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-36 (1987).
60. In Re Annexation Ordinance #D-21927, 303 N.C. 220, 278 S.E.2d 224
(1981).
61. The plaintiffs actually challenged five annexation ordinances adopted by
the city but, like the court, the ordinances will be referred to here in the singular.
See Id. at 222, 278 S.E.2d at 227.
62. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-45 (1987) is the statement of general state policy
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This court, quoting from an earlier opinion stated:
[T]he provisions of G.S. §160A-45 are merely statements of
policy. No procedural steps, substantive rights, or annexation re-
quirements are contained in that statute. The policies enumer-
ated there are aids for statutory interpretation when other sec-
tions of part 3 of Chapter 160A are in need of clarification,
definition, and interpretation."
N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-50(f) limits the ability of the courts to
hear arguments stemming from annexation to three circumstances:
(1) that the statutory procedure was not followed or;
(2) that the provisions of G.S. §160A-47 were not met or;
(3) that the provisions of G.S. §160A-48 were not met.
This court concluded that the policy statements contained in
G.S. §160A-45 were not part of the procedure under G.S. §160A-50
and did not establish a separate test of reasonableness to be con-
sidered on review.
The plaintiffs also alleged that the annexation ordinance was
invalid because the city had relied upon municipal employees
to conduct the studies, investigations and make reports in the an-
nexation procedure. The court found no merit to this argument
saying that the use of municipal employees to perform such ser-
vices was within the discretion of the municipal officials to use
their employees for such tasks.
After resolving these issues, and the previously addressed con-
stitutional issues raised by the plaintiffs, the court affirmed the
trial court's decision that the annexation ordinance was valid.
In 1983 the North Carolina Court of Appeals was faced with
an issue stemming from simultaneous annexation. In McKenzie v.
High Point,6 the plaintiffs challenged the simultaneous annexa-
tion of two areas.66 The plaintiffs contended that no more than one
area may be annexed in a single ordinance. The court ruled that
under G.S. §160A-49(g) that any number of separate qualifying ar-
eas may be annexed in a single ordinance."' Deciding the issue
regarding annexation by cities of 5,000 or more.
63. Humphries v. Jacksonville, 300 N.C. 186, 189, 265 S.E.2d 189, 190 (1980).
64. 61 N.C. App. 393, 301 S.E.2d 129, cert. denied, 308 N.C. 544, 311 S.E.2d
898 (1983).
65. The plaintiffs also argued that the area to be annexed was only contigu-
ous to an area that had been annexed illegally by the city at an earlier date and
that therefore this annexation ordinance was invalid. The court ruled that this
issue was not properly before the them and summarily dismissed this issue.
66. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-49(g) (1989) provides: "Simultaneous Annexation
1992]
17
Blevins: Municipal Annexation in North Carolina: A Look at the Past Decade
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1992
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
against the plaintiffs, the court affirmed the decision of the trial
court upholding the validity of the annexation ordinance.
In City of Burlington v. Town of Elon College,67 the North
Carolina Supreme Court was given the opportunity to address the
application of the prior jurisdiction rule to this state. The court
began by quoting McQuillin:
The rule that among separate equivalent proceedings relating to
the same subject matter, that one which is prior in time is prior
in jurisdiction to the exclusion of those subsequently instituted,
applies, generally speaking, to and among proceedings for the mu-
nicipal incorporation, annexation, or consolidation of a particular
territory, i.e., in proceedings of this character, while the one first
commenced is pending, jurisdiction to consider and determine
others concerning the same territory is excluded. 8
The court thus found that the City of Burlington, by adopting
its resolution of intent to annex, had taken the first mandatory
public procedural step in the statutory process and had acquired
prior jurisdiction of the area. Therefore any attempt by the Town
of Elon College to annex this same area was null and void.
The defendant argued that for purposes of the application of
the prior jurisdiction rule that voluntary and involuntary proceed-
ing are not equivalent and thus the rule should not apply in this
particular case.6 9 The defendant Town of Elon College relied on
the supreme court's holding in Town of Hudson v. City of Lenoir70
for this proposition. The court in that case had held that Lenoir,
who was annexing voluntarily, had prior jurisdiction over Hudson,
who was annexing involuntarily. The Hudson court felt that this
was an incorporation into the statutes of a legislative preference
for the voluntary procedure. This court, however, rejected the rea-
soning of the Hudson court and found that annexation proceed-
ings, regardless of their nature, were equivalent proceedings. Over-
ruling the opinion in Hudson this court held that where one
municipality institutes valid annexation proceedings first, that mu-
Proceedings - If a municipality is considering the annexation of two or more areas
which are all adjacent to the municipal boundary but are not adjacent to one
another, it may undertake simultaneous proceedings under authority of this Part
for the annexation of such areas."
67. 310 N.C. 723, 314 S.E.2d 534 (1984).
68. 2 MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 7.22a (3rd ed. 1966).
69. The City of Burlington was proceeding with an involuntary annexation,
while the Town of Elon College was attempting a voluntary annexation.
70. 279 N.C. 156, 181 S.E.2d 443 (1971).
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nicipality should be given priority under the prior jurisdiction rule,
and subsequent annexation proceedings, of whatever nature, are of
no force and effect.7 1
In Town of Hazelwood v. Town of Waynesville," the North
Carolina Supreme Court was again faced with a prior jurisdiction
issue. In that case the plaintiff, Town of Hazelwood, adopted a res-
olution of consideration on November 5, 1985. The residents of the
area under consideration petitioned the defendant, Town of
Waynesville, for voluntary annexation on November 18 and 25,
1985. The ordinance annexing the disputed area was adopted on
January 28, 1986, by the defendant. The plaintiff filed a complaint
alleging that their resolution of consideration was the "first
mandatory public procedural step" and that they therefore had
priority under the prior jurisdiction rule and that the annexation
proceeding undertaken by the defendant was of no consequence.
The trial court, finding no genuine issue of material fact, granted
summary judgment for the defendant. The court of appeals re-
versed the trial court and held that the adoption of the resolution
of consideration by the plaintiff established prior jurisdiction by
the plaintiff and that the annexation proceedings of the defendant
were of no effect. The court of appeals reasoned that, while it is
not absolutely mandatory for a resolution of consideration to be
adopted by a city proceeding under the involuntary annexation
statutes,7 3 it is essential if the municipality wishes to avoid waiting
one year after the annexation ordinance is passed.
This court acknowledged that a municipality choosing to pro-
ceed with an involuntary annexation under G.S. §160A-37(i) must
file a resolution of consideration, but G.S. §160A-37(i) is only one
option for proceeding with involuntary annexation. 74
The first mandatory public procedural step that must be met
regardless of the option utilized to proceed with an involuntary an-
nexation is the adoption of a resolution of intent. 5
71. City of Burlington, 310 N.C. at 730, 314 S.E.2d at 538.
72. 320 N.C. 89, 357 S.E.2d 686 (1987).
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. Chapter § 160A (1987).
74. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-37(i) (1989) provides in relevant part:
No resolution of intent may be adopted under subsection (a) of this
section unless the city council (or a planning agency created or desig-
nated under either G.S. §160A-361 or the charter) has, by resolution
adopted at least one year prior to the adoption of the resolution of in-
tent, identified the area as being under consideration for annexation.
75. In 1987, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-37(i) was amended to add the following
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This court then ruled that "the date of adoption of a resolu-
tion of intent is the critical date for determining whether a munici-
pality utilizing involuntary annexation procedures has prior juris-
diction over the same territory being considered for voluntary
annexation by a different municipality. '7 6
This court went on to clarify its holding in City of Burlington
v. Town of Elon College." The court of appeals in this case had
expressed concern that to hold that adoption of the resolution of
intent was the critical date for purposes of the prior jurisdiction
rule would have the effect of arbitrarily favoring voluntary annexa-
tion. This court said that for purposes of the prior jurisdiction rule
that voluntary annexation and involuntary annexation were to be
considered equivalent, but the statute itself has a built in prefer-
ence for voluntary annexation proceedings. The court then decided
that the annexation ordinance adopted by the defendant was valid
and reversed the court of appeals.
In 1987 the North Carolina Court of Appeals was faced with
the issue of whether a county condemnation proceeding took prior-
ity over a municipal annexation proceeding. 8 In Yandle v.
Mecklenberg County the dispute was between Mecklenberg
County, the Town of Matthews and private land owners in the dis-
puted area. Before noon on October 1, 1984, the petitioners, pri-
vate land owners in the disputed area, petitioned the Town of
Matthews for voluntary annexation. This annexation petition cov-
ered five parcels of land including two parcels of land which, un-
known to the landowner, were being considered for condemnation
by the county in order to establish a landfill. On the same day at
2:00 p.m. the Board of Commissioners for Mecklenberg County
publicly revealed their consideration of the same parcel of land as
the site for an alternative landfill. The county mailed notice to
Yandle, the landowner, on that same day. On October 22, 1984, the
Town of Matthews held a public hearing on the proposed annexa-
tion where Yandle spoke in favor of the annexation. No one spoke
in opposition to the annexation. On November 5, 1984, the County
Board of Commissioners directed the County Manager to sent
to the language reproduced in footnote 74:
"...provided, adoption of such resolution of consideration shall not confer prior
jurisdiction over the area as to any other city." 1987 Session Laws, c. 44, s. 1.
76. Hazelwood, 320 N.C. at 93, 357 S.E.2d at 688.
77. 310 N.C. 723, 314 S.E.2d 534 (1984). See supra notes 67-69 and accompa-
nying text.
78. Yandle v. Mecklenberg, 85 N.C. App. 382, 355 S.E.2d 216 (1987).
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"Notices of Intent to Condemn" to owners of eight parcels of land,
including two parcels of land owned by Yandle. The County Man-
ager complied with this directive on November 6. On November 26
the Matthews Town Commissioners adopted a resolution opposing
utilization of the land in question as a landfill. On December 31,
1984, pursuant to a civil action initiated by Yandle, the
Mecklenberg County Superior Court issued a preliminary injunc-
tion enjoining the county from proceeding with the condemnation,
enjoining the town from proceeding with annexation and enjoining
Yandle from taking any action which would affect title to the prop-
erty in dispute. On July 21, 1986, the case was heard by the trial
court sitting without a jury. The trial court found that the first
mandatory public procedural step taken by the town was the certi-
fication of the sufficiency of the annexation petition on October 8,
1984. The court also found that the first mandatory public proce-
dural step undertaken by the county in its condemnation proceed-
ing was the mailing of the requisite notice to Yandle on November
6, 1984. Applying the prior jurisdiction rule to the facts the trial
court concluded that the town had priority of jurisdiction and was
therefore entitled to proceed with its annexation plans. The county
appealed and the court of appeals was left to reach a decision on
the applicability of the prior jurisdiction rule in this case. This
court first noted that for the prior jurisdiction rule to be applicable
the proceeding must be equivalent. This court then held that for
determining the applicability of the prior jurisdiction rule that em-
inent domain proceedings and annexation proceedings are not
equivalent. 9 Having distinguished eminent domain proceedings
from annexation proceedings for purposes of the prior jurisdiction
rule, the court established the rule that "when a county initiates
condemnation of property for a sanitary landfill, and the property
is being considered for annexation into a municipality, the county
may proceed with the condemnation action." 80
In City of Kannapolis v. City of Concord,81 the North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals was faced with a new twist to the application
of the prior jurisdiction rule. On September 24, 1987, the City of
Concord passed two resolutions. The first resolution was designed
to accept. a petition for voluntary annexation of an area known as
Copperfield. The second resolution was a resolution of intent to
79. Id. at 388, 355 S.E.2d at 220.
80. Id. at 390, 355 S.E.2d at 221.
81. 95 N.C. App. 591, 383 S.E.2d 404 (1989).
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annex Lake Concord, a municipally owned piece of property. Lake
Concord is contiguous to the boundaries of Copperfield, which is
contiguous to the boundaries of Concord. On October 29, 1987, the
City of Kannapolis also passed a resolution of intent to annex Lake
Concord.
On October 29, 1987, Kannapolis sought a judicial declaration
that Concord's resolution of intent to annex Lake Concord was in-
valid because the property containing Lake Concord was not con-
tiguous to the Concord municipal limits at the time the resolution
was adopted. 2 On October 31, 1987, the voluntary annexation of
the Copperfield area by Concord became effective and they again
passed a resolution of intent to annex Lake Concord on December
10, 1987. Both parties moved for summary judgment before in the
Superior Court of Cabarrus County. The trial judge granted Con-
cord's motion for summary judgment and denied the summary
judgment motion of Kannapolis. Kannapolis appealed.
On appeal the appellant, Kannapolis, contended that the ini-
tial resolution of intent adopted by Concord was invalid since the
area to be annexed was not contiguous and, therefore they had
taken the first mandatory procedural step by adopting their resolu-
tion of intent on September 24, 1987. Concord argued that the
Lake Concord property was only one part of the area annexed that
day and that the whole area was contiguous to the municipal lim-
its. The court, adopting the position of the appellant, said that the
annexation proceedings to annex Copperfield and Lake Concord
were two separate proceedings and could not be considered one
whole area .for the purpose of determining contiguity. The court
proceeded to hold the October resolution of Concord to be invalid.
Kannapolis then argued that, given the invalidity of Concord's
October resolution, that they took the first mandatory procedural
step and were thus entitled to priority of jurisdiction. The court,
finding that the appellant had failed to comply with the require-
ments of N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-49(j), 8 3 found that this failure to
include the effective date of the annexation in the resolution of
intent was a fatal flaw. Kannapolis argued that the failure to in-
82. As required by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-31 (1989).
83. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-49(j) (1989) provides:
Subsection (i) of this section [which requires adoption of a resolu-
tion of consideration] shall not apply to the annexation of any area if the
resolution of intent describing the area and the ordinance annexing the
area both provide that the effective date of the annexation shall be at
least one year from the date of passage of the annexation ordinance.
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clude the effective date of the annexation did not result in
prejudice to any party and that they had substantially complied
with G.S. §160A-49(j). The court rejected this argument saying
that the requirements of the statute were explicit and essential.
Therefore the appellant's resolution of intent was also invalid.
After invalidating both initial resolutions of intent the court
was left to decide which party could proceed with their annexation.
The second resolution adopted by Concord was undertaken after
the voluntary annexation of Copperfield was complete and conse-
quently the Lake Concord property was contiguous at the time of
the adoption of the resolution of intent. The court determined that
the resolution of intent adopted by Concord was the first valid
mandatory procedural step.
Kannapolis appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court.8 4
In this proceeding Kannapolis again contended that the failure to
include the effective date of the annexation was not a "fatal flaw"
as the court of appeals concluded. The supreme court, citing Town
of Hazelwood v. Town of Waynesville,85 found that the intent of
the statutory one year waiting period is "to require towns and cit-
ies to consider carefully the consequences of involuntary annexa-
tion of a particular area. '" 86 This court concluded that the inadver-
tent omission of the effective date of the annexation did not defeat
the intent of the legislature in enacting the one year waiting period
for involuntary annexation and did not constitute a "fatal flaw" to
the validity of the resolution passed by Kannapolis. Determining
that the resolution of intent adopted by Kannapolis on Suptember
24, 1987, was valid the court concluded that Kannapolis, not Con-
cord, had taken the first valid mandatory procedural step and thus
had priority of jurisdiction.87
In Thrash v. City of Asheville,88 the court of appeals was
faced with the issue of whether a resolution adopted by the appel-
lee, City of Asheville, in 1928, stating that the city would oppose
any attempt to annex certain property estopped the city from later
initiating annexation proceedings with regard to that property.89 In
84. City of Kannapolis v. City of Concord, 326 N.C. 512, 391 S.E.2d 712
(1990).
85. 320 N.C. 89, 357 S.E.2d 686 (1987).
86. Kannopolis, 326 N.C. at 518, 391 S.E.2d at 497.
87. Id. at 519, 391 S.E.2d at 497.
88. 95 N.C. App. 457, 383 S.E.2d 657 (1989).
89. There were other issues involved in this case which related to compliance
with the statutes by the appellee which will be addressed in section II of this
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1928 the city had adopted a resolution promising to oppose any
attempt by the legislature to annex the area occupied by American
Enka Corporation. This resolution was intended to apply not
only to American Enka, but also to its successors, subsidiaries, and
assigns. The appellant argued that the resolution was a valid exer-
cise of the city's proprietary function since the promise was made
to persuade American Enka to locate its facilities near Asheville.
The appellee argued that the resolution was invalid because it was
an attempt to bind the city in the exercise of its discretionary
powers.
This court, citing Improvement Co. v. Greensboro,9' stated
that a contract which deprives a municipality of exercise of its dis-
cretionary powers is ultra vires. Thus if the 1928 resolution de-
prived the city of the ability to exercise its discretionary power, it
would be ultra vires and thus unenforceable. The power of annexa-
tion said the court is an exercise of a city's governmental discre-
tion.2 The annexation power is designed to promote the public
good and any attempt to abridge this power is ultra vires. 3 Con-
cluding that the resolution of 1928 was ultra vires the court of ap-
peals refused to enforce the agreement. The court also rejected the
appellants contention that the doctrine of equitable estoppel
should be applied in this case. Equitable estoppel should be ap-
plied with caution to a municipality to prevent manifest injustice."
Finding that no manifest injustice would arise from the refusal to
equitably estop the city from proceeding with the proposed annex-
ation, the court ruled against the appellant.
Throughout the past decade challenges to the legislative power
to annex and annexation generally have been numerous. The dec-
document.
90. The resolution read:
That owing to the distance of the proposed plant location from the
City Limits of the City of Asheville, and the vast amount of vacant land
lying between said location and said City Limits, that the incorporation
of said plant and land adjoining the same into the City of Asheville is
impractical, and said City of Asheville will oppose such a proposition.
Thrash, 95 N.C. App. at 472, 383 S.E.2d at 666.
This language of opposition, rather than simply a resolution not to annex the
territory, was used because at the time of the adoption of the resolution annexa-
tion was performed by the legislature. Id.
91. 247 N.C. 549, 101 S.E.2d 336 (1958).
92. Thrash, 95 N.C. App. at 474, 383 S.E.2d at 666.
93. Id.
94. Id.
[Vol. 14:135
24
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol14/iss2/1
MUNICIPAL ANNEXATION
ade has seen important changes in the law of annexation, for ex-
ample the adoption of the prior jurisdiction rule in North Carolina,
and the well established areas of law have undergone further refin-
ing. Perhaps the litigation stemming from the power to annex and
annexation generally is only surpassed by the litigation that has
flowed from the compliance with particular annexation statutes by
the annexing municipality. As shall be seen, compliance with statu-
tory requirements by an annexing municipality has given rise to a
multitude of litigation.
IV. CHALLENGES TO COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
BY ANNEXING MUNICIPALITIES
A. Compliance With Statutory Requirements Generally
In the past decade the amount of litigation stemming from
compliance with statutory requirements by annexing municipali-
ties has been predictably high. Although this litigation has covered
the spectrum of the statutes, the majority has involved the exten-
sion of services to the annexed area. Most of these challenges have
been resolved in favor of the annexing municipality.9 5
In 1981, the North Carolina Supreme Court was given the op-
portunity to decide an issue stemming from compliance with N.C.
GEN. STAT. §160A-47.9 6 In In re Annexation Ordinance No. 300-
X97 the plaintiff contended that the city had failed to comply with
G.S. §160A-47(3).9 8 In that case the plaintiff contended that the
city of Charlotte had failed to comply with the statutory require-
ments because they had failed to include in their report an esti-
mate of the amount of personnel and equipment which would have
to be acquired in order to extent these services to the annexed
area. The court rejecting this contention, said that the primary
purpose of the annexation statutes were to assure residents of the
annexed area that they would receive the benefits of the munici-
pality in return for the additional tax burden which would be
95. Some of the cases that were discussed in the preceding section will be
discussed again here as they relate to compliance with statutory requirements.
96. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-47 (1989) is entitled "Prerequisites to annexation;
ability to serve; report and plans."
97. 304 N.C. 565, 284 S.E.2d 470 (1981).
98. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-47(3) (1989) requires, generally speaking, a state-
ment setting forth the municipality's plans for extending major municipal services
to the annexed area. Services required to be included in the plan are police, fire,
garbage, street maintenance, water and sewer.
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placed on them. The court then found that where the city had set
forth the level of services that currently existed in the municipal
limits, committed themselves to provide the same level of services
to the annexed area, and had set forth a plan to finance this exten-
sion of services, they had complied with the requirements of N.C.
GEN. STAT. §160A-47(3). The municipality is not required to esti-
mate the amount of the increase in personnel and equipment that
will flow from the extension of services to the annexed area.
In Cockrell v. City of Raleigh,99 the North Carolina Supreme
Court decided which services offered by a municipality were con-
sidered major municipal services and therefore required to be ad-
dressed in the annexation report required by N.C. GEN. STAT.
§160A-47(3). The plaintiff contended that the city's Annexation
Report did not comply with the requirements of the statute be-
cause the city had failed to make provisions for the extension of
the transit service or cable television into the annexed area. Both
of these services were available within the municipal limits at the
time of the proposed annexation. This court, rejecting a distinction
based on whether the services were actually supplied by the city or
by an independent contractor for the city, stated that the only ser-
vices required to appear in an annexation report were those called
for by the statute. The court acknowledged that municipalities fre-
quently supply services such as parks and recreation, street con-
struction, street lighting, street cleaning, street name markers,
public transportation, and public utilities. °10 The court found,
however, that these services were not required to be included in an
annexation report filed pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-47(3).
The court reasoned that had many of these services were provided
by municipalities at the time the statute was enacted, but the leg-
islature had seen fit to exclude them from §160A-47.
In Gregory v. Town of Plymouth,'10 the North Carolina Court
of Appeals addressed the need for a second public hearing after an
amendment to an annexation ordinance. In that case the respon-
dent, Town of Plymouth, had been required by the trial to amend
their annexation ordinance to set forth more clearly the plans to
provide major municipal service to the annexed area. The town
complied with the order of the trial court and adopted the
amended ordinance without a public hearing. The petitioners ar-
99. 306 N.C. 479, 293 S.E.2d 770 (1982).
100. Id. at 485, 293 S.E.2d at 774.
101. 60 N.C. App. 431, 299 S.E.2d 232 (1983).
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gued that after amending the ordinance the town was required to
hold a second public hearing on the proposed annexation. This
court, citing an earlier court of appeals decision, found that "a sec-
ond public hearing is not required on remand unless substantial
changes are made in the amended plan that are not a part of the
original notice of public hearing and are not provided for in the
plans for service. "102
In Huyck Corp. v. Town of Wake Forest,103 the petitioner con-
tended that the respondent, Town of Wake Forest, had impermis-
sibly used two areas of land to meet the requirements of N.C. GEN.
STAT. §160A-36(b)(2). 04 The petitioners argued that the town had
included these two areas of land in order to avoid the requirements
of G.S. §160A-36(b)(2) and that therefore the annexation was an
impermissible "sham and subterfuge.' 6 The respondent acknowl-
edged that at least one of the purposes for annexing this area was
to meet the requirements of G.S. §160A-36(b)(2). Distinguishing
what it referred to as "gerrymandering" and "shoestring" annexa-
tion, this court held that annexing the areas in order to comply
with the statute was not impermissible, although neither of the ar-
eas would have independently met the "urban purposes" test
under N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-36(c). This court thus concluded
that since each of the areas in the proposed annexation were con-
tiguous to the pre-annexation municipal boundaries and were con-
tiguous to each other through the use of an "umbilical cord," that
the proposed annexation met the requirements of N.C. GEN. STAT.
§160A-36(b)(2).
In Wallace v. Town of Chapel Hill,06 the court of appeals was
called upon to decide, inter alia, whether a municipality could use
different tests to qualify subareas as "developed for urban pur-
poses." In that case the town sought to annex three subareas and
in doing so used three different tests established by N.C. GEN.
102. Id. at 433, 299 S.E.2d at 234.
103. 86 N.C. App. 13, 356 S.E.2d 553 (1987).
104. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-36 (1987) regulates the character. of an area
which may be annexed by a municipality of less than 5,000 people. § 160A-
36(b)(2) states:
"(b) The total area to be annexed must meet the following
standards:
(2) At least one eighth of the aggregate external boundaries of
the area must coincide with the municipal boundary."
105. Huyck, 86 N.C. App. at 17, 356 S.E.2d at 602.
106. 93 N.C. App. 422, 378 S.E.2d 225 (1989).
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STAT. §160A-48(c) 0 7 to qualify the subareas. The petitioner con-
tended that the town was required to classify the three subareas as
a whole and that qualifying the subareas separately was inconsis-
tent with N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-48. The court rejected this argu-
ment, stating that the town could qualify each of the non-contigu-
ous subareas under a different test under N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-
48(c).
In Amick v. Town of Stallings,'°8 the court of appeals re-
viewed a "shoestring" annexation proposal adopted by the Town of
Stallings. The trial court found that, all though the town had liter-
ally complied with N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-36(b)'s requirement of
contiguity, to allow the town to annex in such a manner would be
to defeat the purpose of the statute. 10 9 The town in this case had
used a 7,411 foot strip of land along the municipal border to reach
an otherwise non-contiguous area that it wished to annex. In af-
firming the trial court's remand of the annexation ordinance, the
court of appeals found that the town's literal compliance with the
statute resulted in subversion of the purpose underlying G.S.
§160A-36(b). This court held that it would not construe G.S.
§160A-36(b) in such a way as to permit a result that would contra-
107. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-48(c) (1987) provides:
(c) Part or all of the area to be annexed must be developed for urban
purposes. An area developed for urban purposes is defined as any area
which meets any one of the following standards:
(1) Has a total resident population equal to at least two per-
sons for each acre of land included within its boundaries; or
(2) Has a total resident population equal to at least one person
for each acre of land included within its boundaries, and is subdi-
vided into lots and tracts such that at least sixty percent (60%) of
the total acreage consists of lots and tracts five acres or less in size
and such that at least sixty-five percent (65%) of the total number
of lots and tracts are one acre or less in size; or
(3) If so developed that at least sixty percent (60%) of the to-
tal number of lots and tracts in the area at the time of annexation
are used for residential, commercial, industrial, institutional or
governmental purposes, and is subdivided into lots and tracts such
that sixty percent (60%) of the total acreage, not counting the
acreage used at the time of the annexation for commercial, indus-
trial, governmental or institutional purposes, consists of lots and
tracts five acres or less in size.
108. 95 N.C. App. 64, 382 S.E.2d 221, appeal granted, 326 N.C. 587, 391
S.E.2d 40 (1990).
109. For a map detailing the proposed annexation see Amick, 95 N.C. App. at
66, 382 S.E.2d at 223.
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vene the purpose behind the statute and affirmed the order of re-
mand issued by the trial court.
In 1988, the North Carolina Court of Appeals faced the issue
of whether the trial court's remand of an annexation ordinance
constituted a final adjudication of the petition brought by the
plaintiffs and thereby divested the trial court of its appellate juris-
diction. In Ingles Markets, Inc. v. Town of Black Mountain,110 the
respondent, Town of Black Mountain, alleged that once the trial
court had remanded the annexation ordinance in order to establish
compliance with N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-37, that the trial court was
divested of its appellate jurisdiction. Thus, contended the respon-
dent, the petitioner was required to establish appellate review
anew by challenging the new statute. This court held that the trial
court was divested of appellate jurisdiction upon its remand of the
annexation ordinance and in order for the petitioners to re-estab-
lish this appellate jurisdiction they must file a petition in the supe-
rior court within thirty days following passage of the ordinance"'
From the foregoing it is evident that one who seeks to chal-
lenge the validity of an annexation ordinance based on compliance
with the general provisions of Section 160A bears a heavy burden
of proof that the municipality has, in fact, failed to comply with
the provisions of the statute, and that the plaintiff has suffered
some harm due to this noncompliance. If the municipality can
demonstrate substantial compliance with the statutory require-
ments or show that its failure to comply with the statute is of no
consequence to the outcome of the issue of validity, the annexation
ordinance will most surely be affirmed.
B. Compliance With the Statutory Use and Size Restrictions
During the past decade a number of challenges to annexation
ordinances have been based on the annexing municipalities at-
tempt to comply with the "urban purpose" prerequisite to annexa-
tion.11 2 N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-54 provides that "[iun determining
population and degree of land subdivision for purposes of meeting
the requirements of G.S. §160A-48, the municipality shall use
methods calculated to provide reasonably accurate results." This
statute attempts to determine whether the particular method used
by a municipality was, in fact, "calculated to provide reasonably
110. 98 N.C. App. 372, 390 S.E.2d 688 (1990).
Ill. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-38(a) (1989).
112. As required by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-48(c) (1989).
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accurate results."
In Food Town Stores, Inc. v. City of Salisbury,'13 the peti-
tioner brought numerous challenges to the methods used by the
respondent in determining compliance with N.C. GEN. STAT.
§160A-48. Petitioners contended that the city had failed to comply
with N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-48 by using the method of calculation
set forth in the annexation report. The city counted groups of lots
in single ownership and used for a single purpose as one lot unless
the lots were separated by a street right of way in which case the
lots were counted as multiple tracts. Petitioners contended that
this method of calculation was unreasonable because it failed to
follow the formal subdivision lines which subdivided the area into
numerous lots, some of which were only twenty five feet wide. The
court ruled that the reasonableness of the method of calculation
was viewed in light of the particular circumstances. Finding that
the actual development of the area had proceeded without regard
to the formal subdivision lines and that a restrictive covenant re-
quired ownership of three lots prior to development, the court con-
cluded that the method of calculation was eminently reasonable.
The petitioners next argued that the city had followed formal
subdivision lines in past annexation proceeding and that their de-
cision to do differently in the instant case was arbitrary and capri-
cious. This court ruled that the fact that a different method had
been used by the city in the past was of no importance as long as
the method utilized in the annexation currently being challenged
was reasonable.
The petitioner, Food Town, owned four contiguous lots within
the proposed annexation area. The petitioner alleged that the re-
spondent had erroneously counted these four lots, lots A, B, C and
D, as a single lot. Food Town contended that lots C and D housed
their warehouse facility and lots A and B were unimproved and
should have been counted separately. The court found that the pe-
titioner had, in fact, used lots A and B to support the facility lo-
cated on lots C and D.114 Since these lots had been used in support
of the facility on lots A and B, the court determined that the city
had been correct in counting all four lots as a single lot.
The petitioner next contended that the city had improperly
113. 300 N.C. 21, 265 S.E.2d 123 (1980).
114. The petitioner had been required to build an earthen dam on lot B prior
to construction of the warehouse. The petitioner also used a portion of lot A for
employee parking.
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excluded eight tracts of land from its computation of lots and
tracts. These eight tracts of land were unopened portions of
streets. The petitioner's argument was passed on the possibility
that the tracts could one day be withdrawn from dedication. The
court rejected this notion citing Russell v. Coggin,1 " "[Ilt is now
well settled [that] the dedication of a street may not be withdrawn,
if the dedication has been accepted and the street or any part of it
is actually opened and used by the public." Finding that the tracts
in question were not subject to being withdrawn from dedication,
the court rejected this argument by the petitioner.
The supreme court next heard petitioner's argument that the
5% margin of error was not intended to be applicable to the use
test encompassed in N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-48(c). The court stated
that when a statute is "free from ambiguity and expresses a single,
definite, and sensible meaning, judicial interpretation is unneces-
sary and the plain meaning of the statute controls." ' 6 Finding that
G.S. §160A-54 was free from such ambiguity the court proceeded
to apply the plain meaning of the statute. G.S. §160A-54, said the
court, makes it clear that the 5% margin of error is applicable to
the population and subdivision tests in N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-
48(c), but it is not applicable to the use test established in N.C.
GEN. STAT. §160A-48(c). The trial court, therefore, had erred in
concluding that the figures submitted by the city to establish com-
pliance with the use test were within the 5% margin of error allow-
able under the statute. Finding that the city had only established
that 59.6% of the area to be annexed was in use for qualifying
purposes under the use test, the court reversed and remanded the
affirmation of the annexation ordinance by the trial court.
In Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Town of Wake Forest, 17 the North Car-
olina Court of Appeals was faced with a question concerning com-
pliance with N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-37(e)(1).118 The ordinance in
115. 232 N.C. 674, 62 S.E.2d 70 (1950).
116. Food Town, 300 N.C. at 36, 265 S.E.2d at 132. (citing Mazda Motors v.
Southwest Motors, 296 N.C. 357, 250 S.E.2d 250 (1979)).
117. 58 N.C. App. 15, 293 S.E.2d 240, cert. denied, 306 N.C. 559, 294 S.E.2d
371 (1982).
118. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-37(e)(1) (1989) provides:
[The ordinance shall] [clontain specific findings showing that the
area to be annexed meets the requirements of G.S. § 160A-36. The exter-
nal boundaries of the area to be annexed shall be described in metes and
bounds. In showing the application of G.S. § 160A-36(c) and (d) to the
area, the governing board may refer to boundaries set forth on a map of
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question specified that the area to be annexed was developed for
urban purposes and that over 60% of the area met the use require-
ments of the statute, but the ordinance did not state that 60% of
the area was subdivided into lots or tracts of five acres or less as
required by N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-36(c). The court acknowledged
that both the "use" and "subdivision" tests were required to be
met in order for the area to qualify for annexation, but then went
on to say that not every failure to comply with the statute would
render an annexation ordinance invalid. The following rule was
stated by the court regarding compliance with the annexation ordi-
nance: "Where there has been substantial compliance with the
statutes in delineating the proposed annexation area and there is
no reasonable probability that anyone has been or could have been
misled, the annexation proceedings will be upheld."" 9
In this case the court concluded that no one had been misled
by the city's failure to include the statement of compliance in the
annexation ordinance. The municipality had made the required
statements in the ordinance showing compliance with all other
statutes and made reference to a map of the area to be annexed
which had been properly filed with the Register of Deeds of Wake
County and the Secretary of State. The ordinance and a copy of
the map showing the division of the area into lots and tracts had
been served on the petitioners. This court, therefore, affirmed the
trial court's affirmance of the ordinance.
In Trask v. City of Wilmington,120 the North Carolina Court
of Appeals heard an argument by petitioners, residents of the area
which the city was seeking to annex, that the city had failed to
comply with N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-48(c)(1) by not including in
the area to be annexed a golf course. Inclusion of the golf course
would lower the population density below the statutory require-
ment. The petitioners, relying on the dissent opinion in Greene v.
Town of Valdese, 21 alleged that the failure to include the golf
course was gerrymandering of the boundary lines and a violation of
G.S. §160A-48(e).1 2  The dissenting opinion in Greene v. Town of
the area and incorporate same by reference as a part of the ordinance.
119. Scovill, 58 N.C. App. at 23, 293 S.E.2d at 246 (citing In Re Annexation
Ordinance, 278 N.C. 641, 180 S.E.2d 851 (1971)).
120. 64 N.C. App. 17, 306 S.E.2d 832 (1983).
121. 306 N.C. 79, 291 S.E.2d 630 (1982).
122. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-48(e) (1987) provides: "In fixing new municipal
boundaries, a municipal governing board shall, wherever practical, use natural
topographic features such as ridge lines and streams and creeks as boundaries,
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Valdese, written by Justices Carlton and Exum, expressed the
opinion that the statute's reference to natural topographic features
is "a limitation on annexation and not merely a suggestion. '123
This court chose, however, to follow the majority opinion in
Greene. The majority opinion expressed the rule regarding use of
natural topographic features as follows: "Where, however, to follow
natural topographic features would convert an area which would
otherwise meet the statutory tests . . . into an area that no longer
satisfies those requirements, the drawing of boundaries along topo-
graphical features is no longer 'practical,'. . . within the meaning
of the language of the statute." The court concluded that the peti-
tioners argument was without merit.
In Tar Landing Villas Owners' Assoc. v. Town of Atlantic
Beach,"" the court of appeals was called upon to decide whether
the subdivision test in N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-36(c) could be satis-
fied by counting individual condominium units as a lot or tract. In
that case the town, in order to satisfy the requirement that 60% of
the land to be annexed be five acres or less, counted individual
condominium units as lots or tracts. The trial court found that this
was impermissible. This court, however, finding that the intent of
the statute was to encourage "sound urban development,' 2 5 stated
that each condominium could be regarded as a lot even though the
condominium owners had an undivided interest in the common ar-
eas of the condominium grounds. This holding is in line with
Chapter 47A of the North Carolina General Statutes,2 6 which
grants to condominium owners all the rights of real property own-
ers. This court found that counting each condominium as a lot or
tract was permissible under N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-36(c) and re-
versed the trial court's finding to the contrary.
In Re Durham Annexation Ordinance No. 5791,127 presented
a similar issue regarding the use of an apartment complex to meet
the population test of N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-48. In that case the
petitioners, residents of the area to be annexed, contended that the
municipality had violated the legislative intent of N.C. GEN. STAT.
§160A-48(c) by using an apartment complex to qualify an other-
wise ineligible area for annexation. This court found that the use
and may use streets as boundaries."
123. Greene, 306 N.C. at 89, 291 S.E.2d at 637 (Carlton, J., dissenting).
124. 64 N.C. App. 239, 307 S.E.2d 181 (1983).
125. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-33 (1987).
126. Unit Ownership Act.
127. 66 N.C. App. 472, 311 S.E.2d 898 (1984).
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of the densely populated apartment complex to qualify the other-
wise ineligible area for annexation was permissible.
Lowe v. Town of Mebane12 8 presented yet another issue that
arose from the annexation of an area containing an apartment
complex. In that case the town classified the apartment complex as
commercial rather than residential. The petitioners contended that
the town classified the area as commercial because it would have
failed the tract and lot size test of N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-36(c) and
thus would have been ineligible for annexation. The town argued
that there was no rule regarding the classification of apartments as
either residential or commercial and that the trial court had prop-
erly affirmed the annexation ordinance. This court, stating that
"the general intent of the statutes is not to exclude areas of urban-
ized land from annexation on a technicality," '29 found that the
classification of the apartment complex as commercial was reason-
able. Stating that adoption of the petitioners' argument would cre-
ate the possibility of large areas of apartment dwellers whom a
municipality could not annex, this court affirmed the trial court's
affirmance of the annexation ordinance.
The aforementioned cases indicate that the courts have been
very liberal in their interpretation of the requirements of N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§160A-48 and §160A-36. The probability of success for
one challenging an annexation ordinance based on the municipal-
ity's compliance with size and use restrictions seems quite small.
The operative word in the statute as it has been interpreted by the
courts is "reasonable" and again the courts have been very liberal
with their interpretation of this word. Although it is arguable that
the courts have been more liberal with annexation than was ini-
tially intended by the legislature, it does appear that the legisla-
ture does regard annexation as an important element in the viabil-
ity of North Carolina municipalities. The courts, through their
broad interpretation of the annexation requirements, have given
municipalities broad powers in addition to those granted by the
legislature. As long as the steps taken by the annexing municipal-
ity were "reasonable," and they inevitably are, the courts may be
counted upon to find against the party challenging the annexation.
128. 76 N.C. App. 239, 332 S.E.2d 739 (1985).
129. Lowe, 76 N.C. at 243, 332 S.E.2d at 742.
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C. Compliance With Other Statutory Requirements for
Annexation
In addition to challenges to the land use and size requirements
of the North Carolina General Statutes, there have been a number
of challenges based on the other statutory requirements for annex-
ation. These challenges, like those previously discussed, have typi-
cally been less than successful.
In Hawks v. Town of Valdese,180 however, the petitioner was
able to successfully challenge the annexation ordinance adopted by
the Town of Valdese. In that case the respondent, Town of
Valdese, sought to annex an area that was contiguous solely to the
borders of a satellite area that had been annexed by the respon-
dent. The petitioner contended that "municipal boundaries," as
used in N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-36(b)(1), meant only the primary
municipal boundary of the annexing municipality, not the bound-
ary of a satellite area.
The Town of Valdese argued that since the area within the
satellite was part of the town that the boundaries of the satellite
are therefore municipal boundaries within the meaning of N.C.
GEN. STAT. §160A-36(b)(1). Consequently the area which is contig-
uous to the satellite boundaries is no different than that which is
contiguous to the primary municipal limits.
This court began by noting that when this statute was enacted
there were no provisions for satellite annexation and therefore the
term "municipal boundaries" referred only to primary municipal
boundaries. This court went on to consider what effect, if any, the
1973 amendment of the annexation statutes had on the meaning of
the term "municipal boundaries. '13 1 Concluding that the General
Assembly did not intend to alter the definition of "municipal
boundaries" under N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-36(b)(1), this court
ruled that an area that is contiguous solely to a satellite area is not
subject to annexation. When the area separating the satellite area
from the primary municipal boundaries is annexed, so that the sat-
ellite and the primary municipal boundaries touch, the satellite
area is then considered part of the primary municipal boundary.
Any area contiguous to the former satellite is subject to annexation
if, of course, the municipality is able to meet the other statutory
requirements for annexation.
130. 299 N.C. 1, 261 S.E.2d 90 (1980).
131. Providing for the annexation of noncontiguous areas or, as popularly
known, satellite annexation.
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The North Carolina courts have been called upon several
times in the past decade to answer questions regarding the use of
natural topographical features by municipalities in establishing the
boundaries of an area to be annexed. In Greene v. Town of
Valdese,13 2 the North Carolina Supreme Court heard yet another
case involving an annexation ordinance adopted by the Town of
Valdese. In that case the petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the re-
spondent had failed to comply with N.C. GEN. STAT. §140-36(d).13 3
The municipality in this case had used a tree line to establish a
large part of the boundary of the area to be annexed. In order for
the petitioner to prevail, he had to demonstrate two things: "(1)
that the boundary of the annexed area does not follow natural
topographical features, and (2) that it would have been practical
for the boundary to foll6w such features."' 34 The court first con-
cluded that tree lines were not a natural topographical feature as
that term is used in N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-36(d), due in part to
their lack of permanence. The court also determined that it was
not the intent of the legislature to include tree lines as a "natural
topographical feature" due to the limitations placed upon the abil-
ity of the annexing municipality to provide services such as water
and sewer by natural drainage boundaries. 135 After determining
that tree lines were not "natural topographical features," the court
turned to the question of the practicality of using such natural fea-
tures in the instant case.
In determining the practicality of following natural topograph-
ical boundaries, the court adopted a definition of "practical" from
the South Carolina Supreme Court. That court had defined "prac-
tical" as meaning "that which is possible of reasonable perform-
ance."'3 6 As to the second portion of this two part test, the court
132. 306 N.C. 79, 291 S.E.2d 630 (1982). See also Lowe v. Mebane, 76 N.C.
App. 239, 332 S.E.2d 739 (1985); Campbell v. Greensboro, 70 N.C. App. 252, 319
S.E.2d 323, appeal dismissed, 312 N.C. 492, 322 S.E.2d 553 (1984); In Re Durham
Annexation Ordinance, 69 N.C. App. 77, 316 S.E.2d 649 (1984); Garland v. Ashe-
ville, 63 N.C. App. 490, 305 S.E.2d 66 (1983); Knight v. Wilmington, 73 N.C. App.
254, 326 S.E.2d 376 (1985); Little Red School House, Ltd. v. Greensboro, 71 N.C.
App. 332, 322 S.E.2d 195 (1984).
133. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-36(d) (1987) provides: "In fixing new municipal
boundaries, a municipal governing board shall, wherever practical, use natural
topographic features such as ridge lines and streams and creeks as boundaries,
and may use streets as boundaries."
134. Greene, 306 N.C. at 82, 291 S.E.2d at 633.
135. Id. at 84, 291 S.E.2d at 633.
136. Id. (citing Woody v. South Carolina Power Co., 202 S.C. 73, 81, 24'
[Vol. 14:135
36
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol14/iss2/1
MUNICIPAL ANNEXATION
found that the petitioner had not presented any evidence to show
the practicality of following natural topographical features. The
town, however, presented evidence that an area of open, undevel-
oped land was situated between the boundary established by the
tree line and the nearest "qualifying" natural topographical fea-
ture. Therefore if the respondent was forced to extend the bound-
ary to the next ridge, stream or creek, the entire area to be an-
nexed would fail to meet the use and size requirements of N.C.
GEN. STAT. §160A-36. The supreme court stated the governing rule
as follows:
Where the boundary of the annexed area, which meets the subdi-
vision and use test of G.S. §160A-36(b) and (c), can be estab-
lished along ridge lines, streams, and creeks without defeating the
area's compliance with other portions of G.S. §160A-36 the
boundary must follow such features. Where, however, to follow
natural topographical features would convert an area which would
otherwise meet the statutory tests of G.S. §160A-36(b) and (c)
into an area that no longer satisfies those requirements, the draw-
ing of boundaries along topographical features is no longer 'prac-
tical,' i.e., not 'possible of reasonable performance' within the
meaning of the language of the statute.13 7
Finding. that the petitioners had failed to meet the second part
of the test, this court affirmed the validity of the annexation
ordinance.
In County of Brunswick v. Town of Bolivia,13 the North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals was called upon to answer a question arising
out of a voluntary annexation proceeding under N.C. GEN. STAT.
§160A-58.1. In that case the respondent, County of Brunswick, had
recently relocated their county seat to an area just outside of the
defendant's municipal limits. The defendant, Town of Bolivia,
sought to annex the 38.5 acre governmental complex under N.C.
GEN. STAT. §160A-58.1. 1"9 Pursuant to this effort the town collected
a number of signatures of persons living in Brunswick County and
in the town limits. The county challenged the annexation alleging
that the annexation failed to comply with the requirements of N.C.
GEN. STAT. §160A-58.1 in that the signatures that were on the peti-
S.E.2d 121, 124 (1943)).
137. Id. at 85, 291 S.E.2d at 634.
138. 56 N.C. App. 732, 289 S.E.2d 569 (1982).
139. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.1 (1989) regulates voluntary annexation
.proceedings.
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tion were not the signatures of persons residing within the pro-
posed annexation area. The trial court found that the signatures
on the petition were of no relevance and held that the ordinance
was invalid. This court said that since there was no one actually
living in the area of the proposed annexation, that the signatures
could not be those of landowners in the area of the proposed an-
nexation, which was wholly owned by the county. This court af-
firmed the decision of the trial court that the annexation ordinance
was illegal, null, and void.
The foregoing demonstrates the difficulty faced by a plaintiff
who wishes to challenge an annexation statute based upon alleged
noncompliance with the statutory requirements. Very seldom is
the plaintiff successful in blocking the annexation. Frequently the
most the plaintiff can realistically expect is a delay in the annexa-
tion while the annexing municipality corrects any deficiency. This
delay is most often achieved by the plaintiff at great expense. The
overriding theme that seems to run through each of these cases is
the judicial belief that annexation serves the best interest of both
the annexing municipality and the area to be annexed. In giving
affect to this belief the judiciary has been very liberal in their con-
struction of the annexation statutes. It appears that there will be
no reversal of this trend any time in the near future.
D. Procedural Challenges to Annexation
Challenges to annexation have not been limited to challenges
to compliance with the annexation statutes. A few cases have
presented procedural questions for the courts to resolve. These at-
tempts have largely been unsuccessful, just as the other challenges
to annexation.
In Re Annexation Ordinance No. 1219,10 presented just such
a procedural question for resolution by the North Carolina Court
of Appeals. In that case the petitioners sought review of the city's
annexation ordinance in the Superior Court of Buncombe County.
Pursuant to this challenge the petitioners sent the respondent city
a copy of the petition for review by certified mail, return receipt
requested. The city alleged that the notice was improperly sent
and was thus ineffective under N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-50(b) 1"
which regulates the procedure for challenging an annexation stat-
140. 62 N.C. App. 588, 303 S.E.2d 380 (1983).
141. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-50(b) (1989) provides:
Such petition shall explicitly state what exceptions are taken to the
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ute. The petitioners argued that under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1,
Rule 4(j)(5) 142 that they were allowed to use the alternative
method of service by certified mail, return receipt requested. The
trial court had heard extensive testimony from a veteran postal
employee. That testimony revealed that the only difference in reg-
istered and certified mail is that the post office retains a record of
the transaction when registered mail is sent, but not when certified
mail is sent. The court turned to N.C. GEN. STAT. §1-75.10(4),48
which governs challenges to service of process to resolve this prob-
lem. Finding that the requirements of N.C. GEN. STAT. §1-75.10(4)
were met by the petitioners the court concluded that the use of
certified mail was sufficient and affirmed the trial court's dismissal
of the respondent's challenge.
In Livingstone v. City of Charlotte,4 the petitioners chal-
lenged the trial court's dismissal of certain allegations of impropri-
ety on the part of Charlotte city officials. The trial court allowed
action of the governing board and what relief the petitioner seeks.
Within five days after the petition is filed with the court, the person
seeking review shall serve copies of the petition by registered mail, return
receipt requested, upon the municipality.
142. Rule 4. Process
(j) Process-manner of service to exercise personal jurisdiction.
In any action commenced in a court of this State having jurisdiction
of the subject matter and grounds for personal jurisdiction as provided in
G.S. 1-75.4, the manner of service of process within or without the State
shall be as follows:
(5)(a) Upon a city, town, or village by personally delivering a copy of
the summons and of the complaint to its mayor, city manager or clerk or
by mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint, registered or
certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to the mayor, city
manager or clerk.
143. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.10 (1983) provides:
Where the defendant appears in the action and challenges the ser-
vice of the summons upon him, proof of the service of process shall be as
follows:
(4) Service by Registered or Certified Mail. In the case of service by
registered or certified mail, by affidavit of the serving party averring:
a. That a copy of the summons and complaint was deposited in the
post office for mailing by registered or certified mail, return receipt
requested;
b. That it was in fact received as evidenced by the attached registry
receipt or other evidence satisfactory to the court of delivery to the ad-
dressee; and
c. That the genuine receipt or other evidence of delivery is attached.
144. 68 N.C. App. 265, 314 S.E.2d 303 (1984).
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the respondent's motion to strike certain evidence which petition-
ers alleged showed that the city officials had "conspired, improp-
erly and fraudulently, in tampering with the political and quasi-
legislative process, in attempting to cause the Matthews Council to
deny the petitioners a full and fair hearing" on their petition for
voluntary annexation into the City of Matthews. 148 On appeal this
court stated that N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-50 limits review of only
three issues: (1) whether statutory procedures are followed; (2)
whether the statutory provisions of N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-47 14 6
were met; and (3) whether the provisions of N.C. GEN. STAT.
§160A-481' 7 were met. This court thus concluded that the allega-
tions made by the petitioners were irrelevant to the issues before
the trial court and had been properly dismissed.
In Campbell v. City of Greensboro,141 the North Carolina
Court of Appeals heard a case involving the application of the
North Carolina discovery rules1 49 to an annexation proceeding. In
that case the petitioner sought to discover a variety of documents
held by the respondent. 5 The trial court allowed limited discov-
ery by the petitioners, but refused to allow discovery of a number
of documents and refused to allow the petitioners to depose the
City Manager. On appeal, the petitioner argued that the discovery
rules were applicable to the review of annexation proceedings just
as with any other civil proceeding. The respondent argued that the
discovery proceedings were not applicable to annexation proceed-
ings at all since the proceeding is only a judicial review of a city
ordinance, not a lawsuit. This court first turned to N.C. GEN. STAT.
§1A-1, Rule 1 which states that the rules "shall govern the proce-
dure in the superior and district courts of the State of North Caro-
145. Id. at 266, 314 S.E.2d at 304.
146. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-47 is entitled "Prerequisites to annexation; abil-
ity to serve; reports and plans."
147. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-48 (1987) is entitled "Character of area to be
annexed." *
148. 70 N.C. App. 252, 319 S.E.2d 323, appeal dismissed, 312 N.C. 492, 322
S.E.2d 553 (1984).
149. N.C.R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) authorizes parties to "obtain discovery regarding
any matter not privileged which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action." Id.
150. The documents which the petitioner sought to discover included docu-
ments related to projected revenues from the annexed area, to the impact of an-
nexation on future city budgets, to the reasons or purposes for the annexation,
and to the inclusion or exclusion of particular tracts in the annexation. Campbell,
70 N.C. App. at 258, 319 S.E.2d at 324.
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lina in all actions and proceedings of a civil nature except when a
differing procedure is prescribed by statute." This court found that
the annexation proceeding was a "proceeding of a civil nature" and
therefore the rules applied. The court went on, however, to hold
that N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-50 placed limits on the discovery of
documents in an annexation proceeding as was contemplated by
N.C. GEN. STAT. 1A-1, Rule 1. N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-50, said the
court, sets forth the type of evidence required to be submitted by
the parties involved in the litigation and limits the issues that the
courts may hear on review of the ordinance.151 The judicial review
of an annexation proceeding is thus not the equivalent of an ordi-
nary lawsuit. This court found that, although the North Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable to review of the annexation
proceeding, that the discovery process can be limited by the trial
judge to those issue that are actually before the court.
In Ingles Markets, Inc. v. Town of Black Mountain,1 52 the
North Carolina Court of Appeals heard a case involving the opera-
tion of the thirty day time limit for a petitioner to seek review of
an annexation ordinance under N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-38. In that
case the petitioner contended that a new petition for review need
not be filed after the superior court has remanded an annexation
ordinance for correction of infirmities. This court stated that upon
remand of the ordinance, the superior court was divested of appel-
late jurisdiction and that in order for the petitioner to re-establish
appellate jurisdiction in the superior court that he must raise a
separate petition for review within the thirty-day time limit set
forth by N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-38. This is the case whether the
initial petition raised all of the issues or not. The court therefore
affirmed the superior court's closing of the annexation case at the
town's request.
While it is settled that the North Carolina Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure are applicable to the judicial review of annexation proceed-
ings, it is equally clear that the rules are not applicable to the ex-
tent that they are in an ordinary lawsuit. While this area is less
than fully developed, perhaps the most important question, the use
of discovery, has been settled. The concerns expressed by the
courts have been giving affect to the legislative intent in the an-
nexation statutes and limiting the scope of the rules to match the
limitation placed upon the ability of the courts to review these or-
151. Id. at 257, 319 S.E.2d at 326.
152. 98 N.C. App. 372, 390 S.E.2d 688 (1990).
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dinances. Viewed in this light the limitations placed on the use of
discovery seems quite reasonable.
E. Effect of Appeal on the Annexation Ordinance's Effective
Date
Several questions have arisen in the past decade regarding the
effective date of an annexation ordinance. This is particularly true
when an appeal from the ordinance is involved.
In Moody v. Carrboro,1 53 the respondent, Town of Carrboro,
adopted an annexation ordinance on 19 December 1979, to become
effective on 31 December 1979. The petitioners sought review of
the annexation ordinance in the superior court on 18 January 1980,
after the effective date of the annexation ordinance but before the
thirty-day time limit for appeal from an annexation ordinance as
provided in N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-50(i). On 18 February 1980, the
superior court remanded the ordinance to the town for findings re-
garding the extension of service to the annexed area. On 26 Febru-
ary 1980, the town adopted a new ordinance which was approved
by the superior court on 4 March 1980. The superior court failed to
state when the annexation ordinance became effective. The ques-
tion presented stemmed from a conflict between N.C. GEN. STAT.
§160A-50(a) 1" and N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-50(i). 55
153. 301 N.C. 318, 271 S.E.2d 265, reh'g denied, 301 N.C. 728, 274 S.E.2d 230
(1980).
154. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-50(a) (1989) provides:
Within 30 days following the passage of an annexation ordinance
under authority of this Part, any person owning property in the annexed
territory who shall believe that he will suffer material injury by reason of
the failure of the municipal governing board to comply with the proce-
dure set forth in this Part or to meet the requirements set forth in G.S.
§ 160A-48 as they apply to his property may file a petition in the supe-
rior court of the county in which the municipality is located seeking re-
view of the action of the governing board.
155. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-50(i) (1989) in relevant part provides:
If part or all of the area annexed under the terms of an annexation
ordinance is the subject of an appeal to the superior court, Court of Ap-
peals or Supreme Court on the effective date of the ordinance, then the
ordinance shall be deemed amended to make the effective date with re-
spect to such area the next full calendar month following the date of the
final judgment of the superior court, Court of Appeals or Supreme Court,
whichever is appropriate, or the date the municipal governing board
completes action to make the ordinance conform to the court's instruc-
tions in the event of remand.
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The North Carolina Supreme Court began by stating the now
well known rule that substantial compliance with the annexation
statutes is a condition precedent to effective annexation. 156 The
court then turned to the particular facts of this case. The superior
court remanded the ordinance on 18 February because the town
had not substantially complied with N.C. GEN. STAT. §160A-47(3).
Thus, the court determined, the effective date of the annexation
ordinance could not be 31 December. When the town adopted the
revised ordinance on 26 February this became the effective date
subject to an appeal by the petitioners. When the 'petitioners did
appeal from the adoption of the new ordinance the effective date
was changed to the date that the ordinance was affirmed by the
superior court, 4 March, but was again subject to change if the
petitioners sought further review in the supreme court. When the
petitioners sought review in the supreme court the effective date
became the date that the supreme court made its final determina-
tion of the validity of the annexation ordinance and when that de-
cision is certified to the clerk of the superior court in the county
where the initial appeal was heard. 15 7
In Abbott v. Town of Highlands,158 the petitioners appealed
an annexation ordinance adopted by the town which annexed their
property to the town. On June 5, 1980, the superior court ruled
against the petitioners but stayed its judgment pending an appeal
to the North Carolina Court of Appeals. The decision of the court
of appeals affirming the superior court was not certified until 14
September 1981. The town sought to collect ad valorem taxes from
the annexed area from the date the superior court affirmed the or-
dinance, June 5th. The petitioners contended that the town could
not collect taxes for the period that the stay order was in effect. In
resolving this issue the court turned to N.C. GEN. STAT. §1-296.
N.C. GEN. STAT. §1-296 states:
Judgment not vacated by stay. The stay of proceedings pro-
vided for in this Article shall not be construed to vacate the judg-
ment appealed from, but in all cases such judgment remains in
full force and effect, and its lien remains unimpaired, notwith-
standing the giving of the undertaking or making the deposit re-
quired in this Chapter, until such judgment is reversed or modi-
156. In Re Annexation Ordinance, 296 N.C. 1, 249 S.E.2d 698 (1978); In Re
Annexation Ordinance, 255 N.C. 633, 122 S.E.2d 690 (1961).
157. Moody, 301 N.C. at 330, 271 S.E.2d at 273.
158. 62 N.C. App. 130, 302 S.E.2d 280 (1983).
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fled by the appellate division."'
Finding that the order of the superior court had not been re-
versed or modified on appeal, this court concluded that the resolu-
tion of the case by the appellate court dissolved the stay order and
"left the judgment in effect from its rendition" on June 5, 1980.160
Concluding that the superior court judgment was in full force and
effect since June 5, 1980, this court found that the town was within
its power to tax the residents of the annexed area from that date.
V. MEASURES ADOPTED BY OTHER JURISDICTIONS TO LIMIT THE
SCOPE OF ANNEXATION
A number of jurisdictions have adopted provisions limiting the
ability of municipalities to annex additional territory. Some of
these measures have been enacted statutorily while others have
been create judicially. Although several approaches have been
taken to accomplish this, when reduced to their lowest common
denominator the rule can be concisely stated as simply allowing
the courts who have jurisdiction over the annexation proceeding to
hear the equitable issues raised by the proceeding. In Virginia a
statue has been adopted that explicitly authorizes courts to con-
sider the equity of an annexation in deciding whether the annexa-
tion should stand or fall. 1 This statute requires the court to take
into consideration the interest of all of the concerned parties. 62
The statute also provides an extensive, though not exhaustive, list
of factors that are to be considered by the courts in determining
the best interest of the concerned parties.163 If a majority of the
court is not satisfied that the annexation is necessary and expedi-
ent,""' the court is authorized to dismiss the petition for annexa-
159. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-296 (1983).
160. Id. at 132, 302 S.E.2d at 281.
161. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1041(b) (1989).
162. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-104(b) (1989) provides:
The court shall determine the necessity for and expediency of an-
nexation, considering the best interests of the people of the county and
the city or town, services to be rendered and needs of the people of the
area proposed to be annexed, the best interest of the people in the re-
maining portion of the county and the best interest of the Common-
wealth in promoting strong and viable units of government.
163. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1041(bl) (1989).
164. "Expedient" has been defined as meaning advantagous and in further-
ance of the policy of the state with respect to annexation that urban areas should
be under urban government and rural areas under county government. County of
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tion. 65 If a majority of the court is satisfied that the annexation is
necessary and expedient, they may then "determine the terms and
conditions upon which annexation is to be had."'60 It has been con-
sistently upheld that the burden of proof rests upon the annexing
municipality to show that the annexation is both necessary, expe-
dient and in the best interest of all of the concerned parties.1' 7
Furthermore, the courts have held that the municipality's need for
an increased tax base is not, in and of itself, sufficient to allow
annexation, 8 but neither does it operate as a bar to annexation.' 69
The Virginia statutes also permit a county to apply for immu-
nity from annexation or new municipal incorporation within its
boundaries. 7  This immunity can be either complete or applicable
to only certain parts of the county.' 7 ' If, after passage of an ordi-
nance and application to the court, the court determines that the
county has either a population of 20,000 residents and a popula-
tion density of at least 300 persons per square mile or a population
of at least 50,000 and a population density of at least 140 persons
per square mile, the court shall issue an order declaring the county
immune from municipal initiated annexation and incorporation of
new cities.17 2 This declaration of immunity does not prohibit a
town from achieving the status of a city or prevent voluntary
annexation. 17
Kentucky has also legislated in the area of the courts' ability
to deal with equitable considerations when faced with an annexa-
tion question. Kentucky law provides that a municipality may an-
nex after the passing of an annexation ordinance which describes
the area to be annexed, said ordinance having been published. If
within thirty days after the passage of the ordinance no petition in
opposition to the statute has been filed with the court, a second
Norfolk v. City of Portsmouth, 186 Va. 1032, 45 S.E.2d 136 (1947).
165. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1041(c) (1989).
166. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1041(c) (1989).
167. Johnston v. County of Fairfax, 211 Va. 378, 177 S.E.2d 606 (1970);
Rockingham County v. Town of Timberville, 201 Va. 303, 110 S.E.2d 390 (1959).
168. City of Alexandria v. County of Fairfax, 212 Va. 437, 184 S.E.2d 758
(1971).
169. County of Rockingham v. City of Harrisburg, 224 Va. 62, 294 S.E.2d 825
(1982).
170. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-977.19:1 (1989).
171. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-977.19:1 (1989).
172. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-977.21.(1989).
173. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-977.23 (1989).
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ordinance may be passed and the area is considered annexed."'
Unlike North Carolina, Kentucky case law has held that the stat-
utes must be strictly complied with in order for the annexation to
be effective.17 If, however, a petition in opposition to the annexa-
tion is filed a jury trial is held to determine whether the annexa-
tion should be allowed to proceed."' If the jury determines that
less than seventy five percent of the freeholders of the territory are
opposed to annexation, that the annexation is in the "interest of
the city," and that no "manifest injury" will result to the persons
owning real property in the area to be annexed, the annexation
should be approved. 77 If, however, the the jury finds that seventy
five percent of the resident freeholders of the area are opposed to
annexation, the annexation should be disapproved unless the fail-
ure of the annexation proceeding will "materially retard" the pros-
perity of the city, and of the owners and inhabitants of the area to
be annexed.1 7 8 If the disallowance of the annexation will materially
retard the prosperity of the city and the owners and inhabitants of
the area, the annexation should be approved despite the opposi-
tion. The "manifest injury" referred to must be to the property
owners as a class or a majority of them, but not to particular prop-
erty owners.1 79 Case law has also held that a manifest injury will
result from the annexation when the benefits to be derived are dis-
proportionately low in comparison with the obligations imposed. 80
Interestingly, the courts have held that in determining the burden
placed upon residents of the area to be annexed, one of the bur-
dens to be considered is the responsibility of municipal citizen-
ship.' The burden of proof is on the opposing residents to show
how many property owners are in the area to be annexed and that
seventy five percent of those residents are opposed to annexa-
tion.18 2 Once the number of residents of the area and the number
of residents opposed to annexation has been established by the op-
174. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 81A.010 (Bobbs-Merrill 1980).
175. City of Louisville v. Fiscal Court, 623 S.W.2d 219 (Ky. 1981).
176. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 81A.020 (Bobbs-Merrill 1980).
177. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 81A.020 (Bobbs-Merrill 1980).
178. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 81A.020(2) (Bobbs-Merrill 1980).
179. City of Louisville v. Sullivan, 302 Ky. 86, 193 S.W.2d 1017 (1946); City
of Louisville v. Brown, 119 S.W. 1196 (Ky. App. 1909).
180. City of Louisville v. Kraft, 297 S.W.2d 39 (Ky. App. 1956).
181. Voorhes v. City of Lexington, 377 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. App. 1964); City of
Cold Springs v. Laycock, 312 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. App. 1957)
182. City of Louisville v. Brown, 119 S.W. 1196 (Ky. App. 1909).
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position, the burden switches to the annexing municipality to show
that the failure of the annexation would "materially retard" the
prosperity of the city and of the owners and inhabitants of the area
to be annexed.818 If less than seventy-five percent of the freehold-
ers oppose the annexation the burden is on the opposition to
demonstrate that the annexation is not in the interest of the city
or that a manifest injury will result to the property owners of the
area.1 84 In each of these states the annexation ability of municipali-
ties has been curtailed by legislative action. The statutes basically
allow the courts to consider the equity of a particular annexation
proceeding rather than limiting the courts consideration, as has
been done in North Carolina. Furthermore, in Kentucky the courts
require strict compliance with the annexation statutes rather than
the "substantial compliance" required in North Carolina. 185 Per-
mitting the court to consider the equity of the annexation proceed-
ing allows the courts to make a finding based on the complete pic-
ture rather than a strictly mechanical application of the law as is
currently done in North Carolina.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is undisputed that, with few exceptions, the municipalities
of North Carolina can proceed with annexation unimpeded by the
legislature or the judiciary. The General Assembly has made a leg-
islative determination that annexation is beneficial both to the an-
nexing municipality and to those Who reside in the area to be an-
nexed. In pursuit of this, the legislature has incorporated into the
North Carolina General Statutes a preference for annexation. This
legislative preference is evidenced by the limited judicial review of
annexation proceedings and the relatively simple annexation pro-
cedure among other things. The judiciary, in turn, has been very
generous to annexing municipalities in their interpretation of the
annexation statutes, reling on the determination of the General As-
sembly that annexation is beneficial. The combination of the legis-
lative preference and the judicial deference has created a situation
that is less than equitable for the landowners in the area that is to
be annexed. This double benefit that is currently enjoyed by the
municipalities in this State creates an atmosphere where those
183. Likins v. Clarkson, 280 S.W.2d 491 (Ky. App. 1955).
184. Masonic Widows & Orphans & Infirmary v. City of Louisville, 309 Ky.
532, 217 S.W.2d 815 (1949).
185. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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seeking to challenge an annexation proceeding are wasting both
time and money. This is evidenced by the number of unsuccessful
suits challenging annexation that have occurred in the past decade.
Municipalities are not required to comply literally with the prean-
nexation requirements, "substantial compliance" will suffice. This
relaxed standard, coupled with the judiciary's very liberal interpre-
tation, has made it virtually impossible for a landowner to success-
fully challenge the annexation of his property. While it cannot be
argued that the legislature did not intend for municipalities to
benefit from the favorable provisions in the statutes, there is no
evidence, other than legislative inactivity, to suggest that the Gen-
eral Assembly intended for municipalities to have the added bene-
fit of a very liberal judicial interpretation of the .statutes. Many,
perhaps most, would argue that legislative acquiescence to this
double benefit indicates approval. There are, however, other expla-
nations for the failure of the legislature to act in this area. In each
of their sessions the General Assembly must deal with numerous
issues and priority among these issues is, needless to say, a require-
ment. It is quite likely that the legislature concerns itself with the
issues that are concerning the majority of constituents at any given
time. By their very nature annexation proceedings only affect a
very small portion of the population at any given time, unlike, for
example, a state revenue law. The fact that only a small portion of
the population is concerned with annexation at any given time
gives rise to two problems for one seeking to change the annexa-
tion statutes. The first problem is the inability to act in a con-
certed effort to change the statutes. While a small and constantly
changing minority might be concerned with annexation, it is never
a concern of a majority of of the citizens of the State. The other
side of this coin is that the municipalities of the State maintain a
continuing interest in annexation proceedings and would presuma-
bly be the first to to be aware of, and react to, any changes in the
procedure for annexation.
The second problem flows from the first, and is itself twofold.
Legislatures react to political pressure. The inability of landowners
concerned with annexation to act as a unit deprives them of this
very valuable tool. The municipalities of the State, however, are
always interested in changes to the annexation proceedings. Even
if the municipality is not currently engaged in an annexation pro-
ceeding, one can only assume that they are in a perpetually ready
status to increase their tax base. This creates a powerful, standing
lobby that is very pro-annexation. This is, unfortunately, the type
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of pressure to which legislatures respond.
Another apparent problem is that both the legislature and the
judiciary seem to have forgotten that annexation can result in a
substantial detriment to those who are being annexed. Most city
ordinances prohibit a variety of activities that are permitted
outside of the municipal limits. Perhaps the most significant of
these prohibitions are those relating to industry. Many municipal
ordinances prohibit, either intentionally or unintentionally, the
carrying on of certain buusinesses within the municipal limits. For
example many, if not most, municipal ordinances prohibit the
keeping of farm animals within the municipal limits. This is an
activity that is permitted outside of the city limits. Undoubtably
other such restrictions exist among the various municipalities that
would in some way hinder industry. While the existing prohibited
industries might be allowed to continue to exist, the establishment
of a new proprietor in the same industry would surely be
prohibited.
Another detriment, both to industry and individuals, are the
increased tax burdens that will be placed on them after annexa-
tion. Many industries are established outside of municipal limits
for the sole purpose of paying tax to only one local governmental
entity, the county. Once annexed both industry and individuals
must pay taxes to both the county and the annexing city. This can
be a major detriment to fledgling businesses and to both individu-
als and industries operating on a limited budget. The General As-
sembly and the municipalities would undoubtably argue that these
industries and individuals benefit from the annexation through in-
creased services, but that is certainly is not always the case and is
by any standard a self defeating argument if they are taxed out of
existence.
Yet another detriment flowing from annexation, though argua-
bly less important, are limitations that would be placed on the rec-
reational use of land by residents. Many, if not all, municipalities
place some restrictions on the activities that can be engaged in
while inside the municipal limits. Perhaps the most common re-
strictions are the ordinances prohibiting the discharge of firearms
within the municipal limits. This would certainly prohibit land-
owners from hunting on their property. While this restriction
might be the most common, it is certainly not the type of restric-
tion found in municipal ordinances that restrict the recreational
use of land. Other common restrictions would include regulations
regarding pets and noise. Regulation of each of these is usually
1992]
49
Blevins: Municipal Annexation in North Carolina: A Look at the Past Decade
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1992
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
much more' relaxed outside of municipalities if they are addressed
at all.
Taken to its logical conclusion, the legislative and judicial fa-
voritism shown toward annexation would result in the entire State
coming under some municipal government. This would be disas-
terous for the economy of the State. New industry would probably
seek other locations with more favorable tax benefits and some in-
dustry would be prohibited from entering the State at all. All of
this is said to demonstrate that annexation might not be as une-
quivocably beneficial as the legislature and judiciary would seem to
believe. Some checks on the annexation power are therefore
needed.
There are two logical places where checks can be established
on the annexation power. The first, and most logical, place is with
the General Assembly. These checks could be established in a vari-
ety of ways by the legislature. The legislature could require literal,
rather than just substantial, compliance with the annexation stat-
utes. While this would be a limited check on the annexation power,
it is more than currently exists and it would establish a clear stan-
dard to guide the judiciary in determining the validity of an annex-
ation proceeding.
Another check could be established if the General Assembly
were to establish a maximum size limit on the amount of the area
that can be annexed by a municipality within a given period of
time. This would not only serve as a check on annexation, but
would also force the municipality to consider carefully what they
wish to annex since the annexation might preclude another annex-
ation proceeding within a given time period.
The General Assembly could also expand the ability of the
courts to review annexation proceedings. As the foregoing has
demonstrated, the judiciary is limited in its ability to review such
proceedings. An expansion of this review would allow the courts to
weigh the equitable considerations of an annexation. By its nature,
the judiciary is able to formulate a decision to fit a particular set of
facts, whereas the legislature, by its nature, must legislate gener-
ally. The ability of the court to weigh the equitable considerations
'would provide real meaning to the judicial review of annexation
proceedings.
The second place where a check could be established is with
the judiciary. Although the judiciary has been closely confined by
statute in what it may consider, one of the powers that the judici-
ary does have is the ability to determine what constitutes "sub-
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stantial compliance" with the statutes. To date, the judiciary has
been very liberal in its interpretation of "substantial compliance,"
citing their deference to the legislative determination that annexa-
tion is beneficial for all concerned. Perhaps the judiciary should
consider that the legislative preference for annexation has already
been incorporated into the statutes and therefore be less liberal in
the construction of these statutes.
It is absolutely certain that there is a strong preference, both
in the legislature and the judiciary, for municipal annexation.
Those seeking to challenge annexation should' not be optimistic
about their chances of success. The most the a challenger can hope
for is a delay in the inevitable. Successful challenges to annexation
resulting in permanent injunctions are as rare as the proverbial
hen's teeth and this will undoutably continue to be the case in the
future unless significant changes are undertaken.
Steven W. Blevins
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